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I. INTRODUCTION
Prosecutorial discretion is a tremendous power. In both the criminal and the civil contexts, deciding to initiate enforcement actions is
a considerable responsibility—one that should be exercised with care
and consistency, but one that can be seriously abused. Such discretion is thus perhaps not a power that we should hastily confer on
every member of society.
This concept of prosecutorial discretion as an immense power,
with considerable potential for abuse, offers a rationale for Article III
standing doctrine that appears to have gone unnoticed in the academic literature. Standing doctrine, in my view, curtails the prosecutorial discretion of private plaintiffs. I arrive at this conclusion by
comparing the broad Article III standing of the Executive Branch to
the constraints placed on private parties. I focus primarily on the following (apparent) anomaly: although Congress may, consistent with
Article III, authorize the Executive Branch to assert the abstract “in1
jury to the interest in seeing that the law is obeyed,” Congress may
not confer similarly broad standing on private parties.
It is important to recognize that the authority to “see that federal
2
law is obeyed” gives the Executive Branch a considerable degree of
discretionary enforcement authority. The Executive Branch may
bring suit against any person, anywhere in the country, for any legal
1
2

FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998).
See id.
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violation. But it is not feasible to pursue every transgression of federal law. Accordingly, the Executive Branch must exercise prosecutorial discretion to decide which of these innumerable offenses to pursue in federal court.
The Executive Branch cannot avoid this discretionary enforcement responsibility. The Take Care Clause of Article II, which provides that the Executive Branch “shall take care that the laws [are]
3
faithfully executed,” requires it to “see that federal law is obeyed.”
The Take Care Clause therefore also requires it to exercise the considerable degree of prosecutorial discretion that is necessary to fulfill
that law enforcement function. Moreover, the Executive Branch has
a constitutional duty to exercise that obligation faithfully, with due
regard for congressional mandates and constitutional constraints.
But the degree of discretionary enforcement authority exercised
by the Executive Branch also creates a troubling potential for abuse.
Such discretion can be used to discriminate against, or otherwise unfairly target, certain individuals or groups. For this reason, I assert
that the Executive Branch’s duties to “see that federal law is obeyed,”
and to exercise the accompanying prosecutorial discretion, are nondelegable. Given the potential for abuse, Article II prohibits Congress and the Executive Branch from delegating such discretionary
enforcement authority to private parties, who are not subject to constitutional requirements or to the other legal and political checks
that, to some degree, curtail executive enforcement discretion.
This Article II nondelegation doctrine provides a constitutional
explanation for much of Article III standing doctrine. Standing enforces this Article II nondelegation principle by curtailing private
prosecutorial discretion. Standing doctrine prohibits a private plaintiff from asserting abstract grievances, such as the “injury to the interest in seeing that the law is obeyed,” that would allow her to sue any
person, anywhere in the country, for any violation of law. A private
party may bring suit only if she has suffered a more concrete “injuryin-fact.” That injury, in turn, further limits the scope of her prosecutorial discretion, because she may sue only the person that caused her
injury and may seek redress only for that harm.
Viewing standing in these Article II nondelegation terms has surprising implications for existing theories of standing doctrine. Currently, most scholars and jurists who consider the foundations of
standing doctrine fall into one of two camps. Several prominent

3

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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judges, including Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justice Antonin
Scalia, contend that the Constitution requires that a plaintiff have a
concrete injury in every case, and that Congress may not confer
4
standing on a broader class of citizens. Conversely, most legal academics assert that standing doctrine lacks any constitutional founda5
tion, and that Congress may confer standing as it sees fit. But, interestingly, both sides do appear to agree on one thing: whatever its
rationale, a central feature of standing doctrine is that it blocks pri6
vate suits that might interfere with executive enforcement efforts.
The Article II nondelegation doctrine offers an alternative account. I argue that standing doctrine does have a constitutional
foundation: it enforces the Article II nondelegation principle by curtailing private prosecutorial discretion. And, under this constitutional analysis, standing doctrine’s principal function is not to protect
the Executive Branch. Instead, standing doctrine protects individual
liberty by shielding private parties from arbitrary exercises of private
prosecutorial discretion.

4

See John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219, 1219–21,
1226, 1231–32 (1993); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 881–82, 894–99 (1983).

5

See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on
the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 54 (1984) (suggesting that courts should
not “hold[] unconstitutional an act of Congress” conferring standing on private plaintiffs); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J.
1363, 1371, 1397 (1973) (stating that “at least when Congress so authorizes the Court may
properly render . . . pronouncements [about the meaning of the Constitution] whether
or not recognizable private interests are involved”); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia,
Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE L. J. 1141, 1154–60 (1993) (arguing that the
injury-in-fact inquiry should not be used to limit Congress’s power to confer standing);
Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, ‘Injuries,’ and Article III, 91
MICH. L. REV. 163, 235 (1992) (asserting that “Congress can create standing as it chooses
and, in general, can deny standing when it likes”); see also William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 223–24 (1988) (making the more nuanced claim that
Congress should have “essentially unlimited power to define the class of persons entitled
to enforce [a statutory] duty,” while Congress should have only “some, but not unlimited,
power to grant standing to enforce constitutional rights”); infra note 7.

6

See, e.g., Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L.
REV. 301, 334 (2002) (“The Court has enlisted the injury concept to provide a bulwark
against intrusions on executive power, a task that the concept simply cannot carry out.”);
Roberts, supra note 4, at 1230 (asserting that the injury-in-fact requirement “ensures that
the court is carrying out its function of deciding a case or controversy, rather than fulfilling the executive’s responsibility of taking care that the laws be faithfully executed”); Sunstein, supra note 5, at 194–95 (observing that many “key cases” in which the Court denied
standing “have involved attempts by some plaintiff to require the executive branch to fulfill its statutory responsibilities by enforcing the law more vigorously”); see also infra notes
15–22 and accompanying text.
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This constitutional foundation for standing doctrine changes not
only the focus but also the scope of the constitutional protection.
Understood in Article II nondelegation terms, standing doctrine applies (as a constitutional mandate) only in cases that implicate private
liberty. Such cases include all suits against private parties and all suits
against the Executive Branch in which the real party-in-interest is a
private individual or entity (i.e., suits demanding that the Executive
Branch impose burdens on, or deny benefits to, specific private parties). But this Article II nondelegation theory leaves Congress otherwise free to authorize private suits against the federal government.
The Article II nondelegation doctrine thus offers a constitutional justification for much of Article III standing doctrine, while also preserving some space for legislative action.
In Part II, I briefly contrast the theory presented here with prior
Article II theories of standing. In Part III, I discuss the Executive
Branch’s broad Article III standing. I explain that the Executive
Branch’s Article II duty to “see that federal law is obeyed” requires it
to exercise substantial prosecutorial discretion. In Part IV, I show
that standing doctrine prevents private parties from exercising the
same degree of prosecutorial discretion, and explain that this limitation can be seen in Article II nondelegation terms.
II. A NEW ARTICLE II THEORY OF STANDING
Standing doctrine has sustained great criticism in the academic
7
commentary. The three-part test that comprises the doctrine is easily
summarized, but much less easily explained. The Supreme Court has
stated that standing derives from the “case” or “controversy” re-

7

See e.g., Evan Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341, 381
(1989) (arguing that “modern standing doctrine lacks a coherent conceptual foundation”); Richard A. Epstein, Standing and Spending—The Role of Legal and Equitable Principles,
4 CHAP. L. REV. 1, 4 (2001) (urging that “the American doctrine of standing is in a sad
state of disrepair”); Fletcher, supra note 5, at 221 (“The root of the problem is . . . that the
intellectual structure of standing law is ill-matched to the task it is asked to perform.”);
Nichol, supra note 6, at 304 (claiming that “as a body of law, the standing doctrine has
failed”); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 480 (1996) (arguing that standing doctrine is “theoretically incoherent”); Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 129
(2007) (asserting that current justiciability doctrines, including standing, “serve little or
no useful purpose”); Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing:
Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 639–40 (1999) (arguing that the injury-in-fact
test is incoherent); supra notes 5–6 and infra note 27. For rare defenses of standing doctrine, see infra note 105.
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8

quirement of Article III. In order to satisfy this “bedrock” requirement and bring suit in federal court, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that she has suffered (or is likely to suffer) an “injury-in-fact” that was
(or will be) caused by the defendant and that can be redressed by the
9
plaintiff’s requested relief.
I am principally concerned with the following puzzle of standing
doctrine: the dichotomy between Executive Branch and private party
standing. The Supreme Court has held that Article III prohibits private suits asserting abstract grievances, such as the “injury to the in10
terest in seeing that the law is obeyed.” But, as several commentators have observed, this constitutional limitation does not apply to the
11
Executive Branch. Instead, the Court has repeatedly found that the
Executive Branch may file suit to “see that federal law is obeyed,” at
12
least if it has the blessing of Congress. How can it be that Congress
8
9
10

11

12

See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 225 (2003). The case-or-controversy requirement is
found in U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 225–26; Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990).
FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23–24 (1998) (stating that a plaintiff may not assert a “generalized grievance” “where the harm at issue is not only widely shared, but is also of an abstract and indefinite nature,” such as “harm to the ‘common concern for obedience to
law’” or the “injury to the interest in seeing that the law is obeyed” (quoting L. Singer &
Sons v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 311 U.S. 295, 303 (1940)); see Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S.
437, 442 (2007) (“The only injury plaintiffs allege is that the law . . . has not been followed. This injury is precisely the kind of undifferentiated, generalized grievance . . . that
we have refused to countenance in the past.”); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 573–74 (1992) (“[A] plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper application of
the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits
him than it does the public at large—does not state an Article III case or controversy.”).
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies—And Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 667 (2006) (“Congress . . . possesses undoubted power to authorize enforcement actions by the government. In suits by the government, courts characteristically make no inquiry into injury.”); Edward A. Hartnett, The
Standing of the United States: How Criminal Prosecutions Show That Standing Doctrine Is Looking
for Answers in All the Wrong Places, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2239, 2245 (1999) (observing that,
when the federal government initiates a federal criminal prosecution, it asserts “an ‘abstract . . . injury to the interest in seeing that the law is obeyed’” (quoting Akins, 524 U.S.
at 24)); Trevor W. Morrison, Private Attorneys General and the First Amendment, 103 MICH. L.
REV. 589, 627 (2005) (“Federal courts regularly adjudicate government enforcement actions that would lack ‘injury in fact’ if brought by private plaintiffs.”); Jonathan R. Siegel,
Congress’s Power to Authorize Suits Against States, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 44, 67–68 (1999)
(“The courts do not require the government, as they would a private party, to demonstrate that it has suffered an injury in fact.”).
See, e.g., United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 27 (1960) (concluding that it is “perfectly
competent for Congress to authorize the [Attorney General] to be the guardian of [the]
public interest” in the “due observance of all the constitutional guarantees”); L. Singer &
Sons, 311 U.S. at 303–04 (“[A] suit [to enforce a statute] cannot be instituted by an individual unless he possesses something more than a common concern for obedience to law.
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may confer broad standing upon the Executive Branch, but not upon
13
a private attorney general?
This anomaly may suggest that standing doctrine depends, at least
14
in part, on Article II. Commentators have, however, generally assumed that any Article II theory of standing must take the following
15
16
form : Article II vests the President with “the executive power,” and
further states that he “shall take care that the laws [are] faithfully ex17
ecuted.” These provisions, the argument goes, give the Executive
Branch a general power over law enforcement and private suits to
“see that the law is obeyed” interfere with the Executive Branch’s en-

13

14

15

16
17

The general or common interest finds protection in the permission to sue granted to
public authorities.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 586
(1895) (“[W]henever the wrongs complained of are such as affect the public at
large . . . the mere fact that the government has no pecuniary interest in the controversy
is not sufficient to exclude it from the courts . . . .”); United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co.,
128 U.S. 315, 367 (1888) (“The essence of the right of the United States to interfere in
the present case is its obligation to protect the public . . . .”); see also Newman v. United
States ex rel. Frizzell, 238 U.S. 537, 547 (1915) (“[E]very citizen and every taxpayer is interested in the enforcement of law . . . . But that general interest is not a private but a
public interest. Being such, it is to be represented by the Attorney General or the District
Attorney . . . .”).
The Supreme Court recently indicated that state governments are subject to less restrictive standing requirements than private parties. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497,
518 (2007). This Article focuses on the contrast between Executive Branch and private
party standing and does not address the distinct issue of state standing.
See Hartnett, supra note 11, at 2256 (asserting that, given the differences between Executive Branch and private party standing, the question of “‘Who can constitutionally be empowered to represent . . . public interests in court?’” must be “a question of the proper interpretation, not of Article III or Article I, but of Article II”). The scholarly interest in
Article II also stems from references to the Take Care Clause in a few central standing
decisions. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577 (“To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive officers’ compliance with the law into an ‘individual
right’ vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the
courts the Chief Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to ‘take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3)); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737, 756–57, 761 (1984) (“The Constitution . . . assigns to the Executive Branch, and not
to the Judicial Branch, the duty to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’”).
This Article II theory appears to underlie Chief Justice Roberts’s and Justice Scalia’s approach to standing doctrine. See Roberts, supra note 4, at 1230 (asserting that the injuryin-fact requirement “ensures that the court is carrying out its function of deciding a case
or controversy, rather than fulfilling the executive’s responsibility of taking care that the
laws be faithfully executed”); Scalia, supra note 4, at 894 (arguing that standing “excludes
[courts] from the . . . undemocratic role of prescribing how the other two branches
should function”).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America.”).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed . . . .”).

788

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 11:4

18

forcement prerogative. Private parties may, for example, bring suits
that the Executive Branch has explicitly decided to forgo, and thereby interfere with its overall enforcement strategy. Even more intrusively, a private party might bring suit directly against the Executive
Branch to force it to change its overall enforcement policies or to
urge it to bring an enforcement action against a third party. In sum,
according to this argument, private actions are problematic under
Article II because they interfere with the Executive Branch’s en19
forcement discretion.
There are several flaws in this approach, most of which have been
noted before. Most importantly, as Gene Nichol and Cass Sunstein
have pointed out, the above analysis cannot possibly explain standing
20
doctrine. This analysis provides no principled means of distinguishing between suits in which the plaintiff can show an injury-in-fact, and
those in which she cannot. Although it is true that a private suit to
“see that the law is obeyed” may interfere with the Executive Branch’s
enforcement strategy, so might any other private enforcement ac21
tion. A party with an injury-in-fact is free to bring an enforcement
action that the Executive Branch has declined to bring, and sometimes even to bring suit directly against the Executive Branch. Accordingly, the injury-in-fact requirement of standing doctrine does

18

See David M. Driesen, Standing for Nothing: The Paradox of Demanding Concrete Context for
Formalist Adjudication, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 808, 874 (2004) (“The Article II theory begins
with the premise that the Executive’s power to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed’ limits other parties’ capacity to sue.”); Christopher S. Elmendorf, Note, State
Courts, Citizen Suits, and the Enforcement of Federal Environmental Law by Non-Article III Plaintiffs, 110 YALE L.J. 1003, 1028 (2001) (characterizing this theory to mean that “[w]ere
Congress positioned to empower ‘any citizen’ to enforce its laws, Congress could usurp a
central element of the executive’s Article II prerogatives”); Sunstein, supra note 5, at 211
(interpreting Lujan and other cases to assert that “standing limitations . . . protect against
intrusions on the President’s power under the Take Care Clause”).

19

See, e.g., Steven L. Winter, What if Justice Scalia Took History and the Rule of Law Seriously?, 12
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 155, 158 (2001) (asserting that the typical Article II-based theory “invokes the separation of powers concern . . . that the Executive Branch must be allowed its prosecutorial discretion”).

20

See Nichol, supra note 5, at 1164–65; Sunstein, supra note 5, at 211–14.

21

Thus, as a few commentators have observed, this Article II-based theory, taken to its logical conclusion, would require the invalidation of much existing law. See William W. Buzbee, Standing and the Statutory Universe, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 247, 283 (2001)
(stating that the logical conclusion of this theory would be that “citizens can never enforce statutory law”); Driesen, supra note 18, at 875 (similarly noting that “[a]n exclusive
executive enforcement power would . . . . require disallowance of all private, state, tribal,
and territorial actions litigating federal public law questions, including actions brought by
seriously injured parties”).
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not protect the Executive Branch from private interference with its
so-called enforcement prerogative.
This failure to explain standing doctrine reflects, in my view, errors in the conceptual underpinnings of this Article II-based theory.
First, it conceives of the Executive Branch’s law enforcement function
as a power, rather than as a duty. This conception leads commentators to focus excessively on ways in which private enforcement actions
interfere with the Executive Branch’s enforcement power. And that
leads to the second major problem with prior reliance on Article II.
It focuses on the wrong entity. The focus should not be on the Executive Branch, but on the private plaintiff—the party to whom stand22
ing doctrine actually applies.
I seek here to offer a constitutional analysis that avoids these con23
ceptual problems. I believe, as Professor Sunstein and others have

22

23

The focus on executive enforcement power has led some commentators to suggest that
standing doctrine applies only when a private party brings suit against the Executive
Branch. See Harold J. Krent & Ethan G. Shenkman, Of Citizen Suits and Citizen Sunstein, 91
MICH. L. REV. 1793, 1793 n.5 (1993) (asserting that suits against private parties “do[] not
rise to the level of a constitutional concern”); Winter, supra note 19, at 159. The Court
has, however, applied standing requirements in suits against private parties as well as state
and local governments. See infra note 96.
Harold Krent and Ethan Shenkman have offered perhaps the most cogent Article II
analysis to date. Relying on the theory of the “unitary executive,” Krent and Shenkman
assert that Article II prevents private parties that lack an “individuated” interest (an interest that appears to be analogous to an Article III injury-in-fact) from bringing enforcement actions in federal court. See Krent & Shenkman, supra, at 1794–96. The authors argue that the principle of political accountability underlying the notion of the unitary
executive requires that the President be in charge of law enforcement efforts involving
the “unindividuated” interests of the public at large. Id. at 1794–96, 1804–08. Krent and
Shenkman offer many persuasive policy arguments as to why the President should be in
charge of certain law enforcement activities. But they do not clearly explain why there is
any constitutional distinction between cases involving individuated and unindividuated interests. See Cass R. Sunstein, Correspondence, Article II Revisionism, 92 MICH. L. REV. 131,
137 (1993) (stating, in response to the Krent & Shenkman article, that “[t]he unanswered
question remains why [the] distinction [between individuated and unindividuated interests] is crucial for purposes of Article II”). Furthermore, Krent and Shenkman suggest
that their constitutional analysis is limited to suits against the Executive Branch. See Krent
& Shenkman, supra, at 1793 n.5.
For purposes of this constitutional analysis, I bracket questions about the historical foundations of standing doctrine. For historical arguments that standing must not be a constitutional requirement, because courts at the Founding did not require private parties to
demonstrate an injury-in-fact, see Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a
Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816, 819–27 (1969); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1396–99 (1988).
For a contrary position, see Bradley S. Clanton, Standing and the English Prerogative Writs:
The Original Understanding, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1001 (1997); Ann Woolhandler & Caleb
Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 691, 694–724 (2004)

790

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 11:4
24

asserted, that the Take Care Clause creates a “duty, not a license.”
Indeed, that formulation is more in keeping with the text of the provision, which states that the Executive Branch “shall take Care that the
25
Laws be faithfully executed.” Furthermore, my focus is not on how a
private enforcement action might interfere with the Executive
Branch’s so-called enforcement power, but rather on how much enforcement power may be exercised by a private plaintiff.
This conceptual approach makes possible a more coherent understanding of standing doctrine. The Take Care Clause imposes on the
Executive Branch a duty to take appropriate measures, including filing suit in federal court, to “see that federal law is obeyed.” The Take
Care Clause thus also (as discussed in Part III) imposes a corollary responsibility. It requires the Executive Branch to exercise the substantial degree of prosecutorial discretion that is necessary to fulfill that
26
law enforcement obligation.
I argue here that these Article II duties are nondelegable. As
commentators critical of executive enforcement discretion have argued (and as discussed in Part IV), such discretion creates a troubling
potential for abuse, even when it is exercised by a governmental entity that is subject to constitutional and other legal and political constraints. Given this potential for abuse, the Constitution prohibits
Congress and the Executive Branch from delegating such prosecutorial discretion to private parties, who are subject to no such requirements.
This Article II nondelegation principle offers a new rationale for
Article III standing doctrine. Standing enforces the Article II nondelegation doctrine by curtailing private prosecutorial discretion.
Standing doctrine prohibits a private plaintiff from asserting an abstract grievance (such as the “injury to the interest in seeing that the
law is obeyed”) that would allow her to sue any person for any legal
violation. Furthermore, standing doctrine permits a court to identify

24

25
26

(asserting, based on their comprehensive survey of early American law, that “history does
not defeat standing doctrine” (emphasis omitted)).
Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653,
670 (1985); see Caminker, supra note 7, at 377 (“[T]he take care clause is better understood as a directive that the President must execute the law consistently with Congress’
will, rather than as a grant of exogenously defined power . . . .”).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added).
The term “prosecutorial discretion,” as used here, refers to the authority to decide
whether to pursue a violation of law by bringing an enforcement action in federal court.
The term applies to enforcement actions (including civil suits) brought by both the Executive Branch and private parties.
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private enforcement actions that do not implicate the Executive
Branch’s nondelegable Article II responsibilities. When a private party has suffered an injury-in-fact, she cannot exercise substantial prosecutorial discretion. She may sue only the person that caused her
injury and may seek redress only for that harm.
This Article II nondelegation concept of standing rests on normative premises that differ markedly from prior Article II theories. Under the Article II nondelegation principle, standing doctrine serves
not to protect the Executive Branch, but instead to safeguard individual liberty against arbitrary exercises of private prosecutorial discretion. The constitutional protection therefore applies only in cases
that implicate private liberty: all suits against private defendants and
all suits against the Executive Branch in which the real party-ininterest is a private individual or entity. That latter category consists
of (1) suits demanding that the Executive Branch impose burdens on
particular private parties (by, for example, bringing an enforcement
action against them); and (2) suits seeking to prevent the Executive
Branch from conferring a benefit (such as a license, permit, or financial grant) on a specific private party. To bring any such action, a
private plaintiff must demonstrate a concrete injury-in-fact.
This Article II nondelegation theory does not, of course, rationalize every facet of standing doctrine. The concept of standing as a limit on private prosecutorial discretion helps to explain and justify the
prohibition on abstract grievances—the part of the injury-in-fact requirement that the Court has identified as constitutionally mandated.
But I do not purport to defend every standing decision. It is indeed
difficult, as many commentators have observed, to understand why
the Court has recognized certain injuries-in-fact and not others, and
why the Court has adopted a narrow view of causation and redress27
ability in some cases and not others.
27

See supra notes 5–7. The Court itself has acknowledged that standing doctrine has flaws.
See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (“We need not mince words when we say that the concept of ‘Art. III
standing’ has not been defined with complete consistency in all of the various cases decided by this Court . . . .”). For just a few of the insightful critiques of the Court’s standing jurisprudence, see Fallon, supra note 5, at 22–30, 43–47 (contending that, once a
plaintiff has demonstrated an injury-in-fact, the Court should not substantially restrict the
remedies that she may pursue to redress that injury); Fletcher, supra note 5, at 229–39
(asserting that the Court should abandon the “injury-in-fact” inquiry altogether and focus
on whether the relevant statutory or constitutional provision confers a legal right on the
plaintiff); Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Standing and Misunderstanding in Voting
Rights Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2276, 2280–88 (1998) (asserting that neither precedent nor
any identifiable theory explains the manner in which the Court has defined an injury-in-
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The Article II nondelegation principle does, however, help explain why—and when—a private plaintiff must assert a concrete injury that guides her prosecutorial discretion. This theory thus also
carves out some space for congressional conferrals of standing. Although Congress may never permit a private party to bring suit against
any person, anywhere in the country, for any violation of law, Congress does have some leeway to authorize any person to sue the Ex28
ecutive Branch.
III. THE ARTICLE III STANDING OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
In this Part, I examine the nature of and the basis for the Execu29
tive Branch’s broad Article III standing. This analysis reveals that
the Executive Branch’s duty to “see that federal law is obeyed” requires it to exercise a substantial degree of prosecutorial discretion.
A. Standing to Enforce Federal Law
By the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court made it clear
that the Executive Branch had standing to assert injuries that would
not suffice for a private plaintiff. For example, in United States v.
30
American Bell Telephone Co., an 1888 case involving a land patent, the
Court observed that a private party (at that time) could challenge the
validity of such a patent only if she had a “pecuniary interest” in the
31
matter. By contrast, the Executive Branch was not so constrained:
“the right of the United States to interfere” in the action arose from
32
its “obligation to protect the public.”

28

29

30
31
32

fact in the racial gerrymandering context); Nichol, supra note 5, at 1154–60 (arguing that
the Court’s injury-in-fact inquiry is malleable and essentially value-laden); Sunstein, supra
note 5, at 183–92 (asserting that the proper inquiry is whether the relevant provision creates a cause of action for the plaintiff); Mark V. Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea
for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663, 680–84 (1977) (asserting that the Court’s standing inquiry often amounts to a determination on the merits of the plaintiff’s claim).
For purposes of this analysis, I bracket questions of Congress’s power to confer standing
in suits against the States. Such cases could raise federalism concerns that are beyond the
scope of this Article.
I focus on Congress’s authority to confer standing on the Executive Branch, not on
whether the Executive Branch has inherent power to file suit absent congressional authorization. For insightful discussions of the latter issue, see Henry P. Monaghan, The
Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1993); Larry W. Yackle, A Worthy
Champion for Fourteenth Amendment Rights: The United States in Parens Patriae, 92 NW. U. L.
REV. 111 (1997).
128 U.S. 315 (1888).
See id. at 366–67.
Id.
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33

Likewise, in In re Debs, the Court stated that the federal government’s “obligation[] . . . to promote the interest of all” and to “prevent . . . injury to the general welfare” can often be “sufficient to give
34
[the United States] a standing in court.” Accordingly, the Court
upheld the Executive Branch’s standing to protect the public interest
35
in the free flow of interstate commerce. Federal courts followed suit
in subsequent cases, raising no Article III concerns about law en36
forcement actions brought by the Executive Branch.
37
United States v. Raines constitutes perhaps the most explicit statement of Congress’s authority to confer standing on the Executive
Branch. In Raines, the federal government brought suit against local
officials in Georgia, alleging that they had improperly interfered with
38
voter registration efforts by African Americans. The Civil Rights Act
39
of 1957 expressly permitted such suits. The local officials, however,
argued that Congress lacked the power to “authorize the United
States to bring this action in support of private constitutional
40
rights.”
The Supreme Court rejected that contention, stating that “there is
the highest public interest in the due observance of all the constitutional guarantees, including those that bear the most directly on pri41
vate rights.” The Court found that it was “perfectly competent” for

33
34
35
36

37
38
39
40
41

158 U.S. 564 (1895).
Id. at 584.
See id. at 599.
See supra notes 11–12. Courts have doubted the Executive Branch’s standing to bring suit
only when it lacked express congressional approval. See, e.g., United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 201 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that “the United States may not sue [a
local police department] to enjoin violations of individuals’ fourteenth amendment
rights without specific statutory authority”); United States v. Mattson, 600 F.2d 1295, 1297
(9th Cir. 1979) (concluding that, absent statutory authorization, the Executive Branch
may not sue a state to protect the constitutional rights of the mentally retarded confined
in state hospitals); United States v. Solomon, 563 F.2d 1121, 1123–24 (4th Cir. 1977)
(same). But the courts’ analyses also indicated that, once Congress authorized the lawsuits, there would be no Article III barrier. See City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d at 201 & n.22;
Mattson, 600 F.2d at 1297 (stating that the Executive Branch could “easily” establish standing if it had “specific statutory authority”); Solomon, 563 F.2d at 1125, 1128 (declining to
hold that the Executive Branch could sue “in the absence of specific authority,” even
though the court had “no doubt that the United States has an interest . . . in the subject
matter of the suit”).
362 U.S. 17 (1960).
Id. at 19.
Id. at 19–20; see also Civil Rights Act of 1957, 71 Stat. 637 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a),
(c) (2000)).
Raines, 362 U.S. at 27.
Id.
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Congress to authorize the Executive Branch “to be the guardian of
42
that public interest.”
Notably, the Raines Court did not conclude that the Executive
Branch had standing to assert the private parties’ concrete interest in
43
the right to vote.
Instead, the Court found that the Executive
Branch was authorized to serve as the “guardian” of the abstract “public interest” in the “due observance of all the constitutional guaran44
tees.” Few formulations come closer to stating that Congress may,
consistent with Article III, authorize the Executive Branch to see that
the law is obeyed.
B. The Constitutional Foundation for the Executive Branch’s Standing
The Supreme Court has not sought to explain the constitutional
basis for the Executive Branch’s broad Article III standing, but the
answer seems fairly self-evident. The Court does not interpret Article
III in a vacuum, but instead construes Article III in conjunction with
the Take Care Clause of Article II.
The Take Care Clause states that the President “shall take Care
45
that the Laws be faithfully executed.” The provision thereby seems
to direct the President to take appropriate measures to “see that federal law is obeyed.” And, as the Supreme Court has observed, “[a]
46
lawsuit is the ultimate remedy for a breach of the law.” Thus, the
Constitution appears to direct the President, in appropriate cases, to
file suit in federal court to enforce federal law.
Of course, we have long understood that this duty to “take Care
that the Laws [are] faithfully executed” does not require the Presi47
dent to personally initiate federal court enforcement actions. Instead, the President exercises his law enforcement responsibilities
42
43

44
45
46
47

Id.
Nor could the Executive Branch assert such private interests under the Court’s traditional
standing jurisprudence. To have third-party standing, a litigant must demonstrate an injury-in-fact, a close relationship with the third party whose rights are at issue, and that the
third party is unable to protect her own interests. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411
(1991). The Executive Branch could not satisfy that first requirement, absent special
standing rules.
Raines, 362 U.S. at 27.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976).
See id. at 135 (“‘[T]he President alone and unaided could not execute the laws. He must
execute them by the assistance of subordinates.’” (quoting Myers v. United States, 272
U.S. 52, 117 (1926))); In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 63–64 (1890) (stating that the President
may fulfill his constitutional obligation to ensure that the laws are “faithfully executed” by
delegating to, inter alia, executive departments).
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through public officials in the Executive Branch. Accordingly, I refer to the duty to “take care that the laws [are] faithfully executed” as
an obligation of the Executive Branch.
The Executive Branch could not perform this constitutionally assigned duty if it lacked the authority to bring suit in federal court to
see that federal law was obeyed. The federal courts accordingly construe such an executive enforcement action as a justiciable Article III
case or controversy. Indeed, an interpretation that prevented the
Executive Branch from performing this constitutional duty would
49
contravene longstanding separation of powers principles.
We should keep in mind, however, that this contextual analysis—
interpreting Article III in light of Article II—has different implications for private enforcement actions. In contrast to the Executive
Branch, a private party has no Article II duty to “see that federal law is
obeyed.” Accordingly, the constitutional structure does not suggest
that such a private suit must qualify as an Article III “case” or “controversy.” Instead, as discussed in Part IV, a contextual reading of Articles II and III indicates precisely the opposite.

48

As used here, the term “Executive Branch” encompasses both independent and executive
agencies. (A federal agency is typically considered “independent” if the President lacks
the authority to remove the agency’s leaders “at will.” See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 492 (1987)). Although in some contexts it
may be appropriate to distinguish these two types of agencies, no such distinctions need
be made here. The Department of Justice (an executive agency) supervises virtually all
litigation by the United States and represents both independent and executive agencies
in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 519 (2006) (authorizing the Attorney General to
represent the interests of the United States in court); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies
in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 587
(1984) (“The Department of Justice, to varying degrees, represents [the] interests [of
both types of agencies] in court . . . .”). Accordingly, as other commentators have observed, independent and executive agencies are largely indistinguishable, at least insofar
as they bring suit to see that federal law is obeyed. See, e.g., Michael Herz, United States v.
United States: When Can the Federal Government Sue Itself?, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 893, 954
(1991) (“[A]t least in regard to litigation, viewing independent agencies as different from
executive agencies is a mistake.”).

49

See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 701 (1997) (“‘[T]he separation-of-powers doctrine requires that a branch not impair another in the performance of its constitutional duties.’”
(quoting Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996))); see also Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 383 (1989) (stating that the “separation-of-powers inquiry” often “focus[es] ‘on the extent to which [a provision of law] prevents the Executive Branch from
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions’” (quoting Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen.
Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)) (second alteration in original)).
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C. The Executive Branch’s Prosecutorial Discretion
The Executive Branch’s Article II duty to “see that federal law is
obeyed” encompasses a corollary responsibility. To fulfill that law enforcement function, the Executive Branch must exercise a considerable degree of prosecutorial discretion. This realization has significant implications for private enforcement actions. The Executive
Branch’s prosecutorial discretion provides a window into the degree
of prosecutorial power that a private plaintiff would have, if she too
could pursue the “injury to the interest in seeing that the law is obeyed.” Indeed, private parties would have even greater prosecutorial
discretion, because they are not subject to the legal and political
checks that, to some degree, constrain executive enforcement officials. As discussed in Part IV, these distinctions seem to explain why
our legal system accords a greater degree of discretionary enforce50
ment authority to the Executive Branch.
1. The Breadth of the Executive Branch’s Prosecutorial Discretion
As many commentators have observed, the Executive Branch al51
ways exercises some discretion in interpreting and applying the law.
Statutory and regulatory provisions supply only general guidelines for
conduct. The Executive Branch must apply those general proscrip52
tions to specific scenarios. Moreover, there are countless transgressions of federal law, and the Executive Branch lacks the time and the
53
54
financial resources to pursue each one, even if it wished to. Ac50

51

52

53

In discussing prosecutorial discretion, I draw upon analyses from both the criminal and
the civil enforcement contexts, which raise analogous concerns. See Marshall v. Jerrico,
Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248 (1980) (“Our legal system has traditionally accorded wide discretion to criminal prosecutors in the enforcement process, and similar considerations have
been found applicable to administrative prosecutors . . . .” (citations omitted)); see also
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (recognizing that “an agency’s refusal to institute [civil enforcement] proceedings shares to some extent the characteristics of the
decision of a [criminal] prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict”).
See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 373 (2002)
(“Very few rules are entirely opaque; most leave some room for interpretation and discretion in application.”).
See John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 725
(1997) (“Every statute confers some degree of discretion on those who implement it. No
legislator, however prescient, can predict all the twists and turns that lie ahead for his or
her handiwork.”).
See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 107 (2005) (“The budget and
manpower of federal regulatory agencies are generally quite limited, and many agencies
simply lack the capacity to enforce the law adequately.”).
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cordingly, the Executive Branch must pick and choose among these
innumerable violations and determine which to pursue in federal
court.
I am most interested in the breadth of the Executive Branch’s
prosecutorial discretion. The Executive Branch’s authority to “see
that federal law is obeyed” allows it to pursue any transgression of
federal law. Accordingly, the Executive Branch has the discretion to
bring suit against any person, anywhere in the country, for any violation. The authority of a particular agency is only somewhat more limited. An agency may bring suit against any person, anywhere in the
country, for any violation of a particular subset of federal law. In either case, that is an extraordinary discretionary power.
For the Executive Branch, it is also an extraordinary responsibility.
As discussed below, the Executive Branch is not (at least in principle)
free to exercise its enforcement discretion as it pleases. But that discussion should not distract us from this point: a considerable degree
of prosecutorial discretion inevitably accompanies the authority to
see that the law is obeyed.
2. Legal and Political Constraints on Executive Enforcement Discretion
The academic commentary on executive enforcement discretion
suggests that there is much agreement on how the Executive Branch
should exercise its prosecutorial discretion (although there is much
disagreement over the extent to which it adheres to that ideal). I
draw upon this literature and relevant doctrine to identify certain essential elements of that normative standard: faithful interpretation,
uniformity, and nondiscrimination. I also note various ways in which
our legal system can hold the Executive Branch accountable when it
fails to comply with that standard. Notably, I offer this account, not
to suggest that the Executive Branch always (or even typically) abides
by that normative standard, but instead to underscore (as discussed
in Part IV) that private parties have no similar obligations and are
subject to no such constraints.

54

Various commentators have observed that full enforcement of the law might be unwise,
even if it were feasible, because it could discourage lawful and socially beneficial conduct.
See Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. L.J. 1743, 1749 n.14
(2005) (observing that overenforcement “is detrimental to society . . . when it chills socially beneficial conduct”); Deborah Platt Majoras, Recognizing the Significance of Prosecutorial Discretion in a Multi-Layered Antitrust Enforcement World, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 121,
123–24 (2002) (noting that overenforcement may cause parties to “avoid[] legitimate behavior”).
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First, the Executive Branch should, in accordance with the very
text of the Take Care Clause, interpret and apply the law faithfully.
Thus, the Executive Branch should not construe a legal provision
narrowly, so as to render it essentially meaningless. Nor should the
55
Executive Branch refuse to enforce a provision of law simply because the current presidential administration disagrees with its un56
derlying policies.
57
The Executive Branch should also apply the law uniformly, establishing national enforcement policies and priorities to guide its en58
forcement officials in exercising prosecutorial discretion. And, critically, these policies and priorities must be “nondiscriminatory.” As
used here, that term means that the Executive Branch may not use its
prosecutorial discretion to favor or disfavor certain individuals or
groups. Thus, the Executive Branch should not pursue individuals
59
for nefarious reasons, such as personal animosity, or because of
60
their race or ideology. Nor should administrative officials decline to
55

56

57

58

59

60

See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws,
104 YALE L.J. 541, 583–84 (1994) (stating that the Take Care Clause “mak[es] clear that
the President has no royal prerogative to suspend statutes”); Sunstein, supra note 24, at
670 (“[T]he ‘take Care’ clause does not authorize the executive to fail to enforce those
laws of which it disapproves.”). Justice Scalia has, however, expressed a contrary view. See
Scalia, supra note 4, at 897 (arguing that executive officials should not enforce laws that
have outlived their usefulness).
See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2347 (2001)
(noting the “risk that a presidential administration might displace the preferences of a
prior . . . Congress by interpreting statutes inconsistently with their drafters’ objectives”).
One exception may be when the Executive Branch considers a statute to be unconstitutional. Because the Constitution is the supreme law that the Executive Branch is charged
with faithfully executing, it should perhaps decline to enforce seemingly unconstitutional
provisions. See Arthur S. Miller, The President and Faithful Execution of the Laws, 40 VAND. L.
REV. 389, 397 (1987) (noting this possibility, but arguing that the President should enforce the law even in this context).
See Griffin B. Bell, The Attorney General: The Federal Government’s Chief Lawyer and Chief Litigator, or One Among Many?, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1049, 1068 (1978) (asserting that the Executive Branch should adopt a “coherent, consistent interpretation of the law, to the extent that it is administratively possible to do so”).
See, e.g., Richard M. Thomas, Prosecutorial Discretion and Agency Self-Regulation: CNI v.
Young and the Aflatoxin Dance, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 152 (1992) (asserting that agencies
should adopt enforcement guidelines).
See Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 5
(1940) (stating that “the most dangerous power of the prosecutor” is “that he will pick
people that he thinks he should get, rather than pick cases that need to be prosecuted”).
See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (stating that the Executive Branch
may not bring an enforcement action to punish an individual for “exercis[ing] . . . protected statutory and constitutional rights”); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 373–74 (1886) (holding that administrative officials violated the Fourteenth
Amendment when they discriminated on the basis of race in applying a local ordinance);
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bring enforcement actions against regulated parties that have sought
61
Instead, the Executive Branch
to “capture” the relevant agency.
should apply the law in an evenhanded and consistent manner.
Recent history has, however, cast doubt on the Executive Branch’s
willingness or capacity to enforce the law in accordance with this
nondiscrimination principle. According to media reports, the Justice
Department under Attorney General Alberto Gonzales was politically
62
biased in exercising its prosecutorial discretion. Several U.S. Attorneys claimed that they were discharged, either because they brought
criminal prosecutions against President George W. Bush’s political
supporters or because they failed to prosecute his political opponents. This “U.S. Attorney Scandal,” along with other complaints of
improper management and low morale at the Justice Department,
stirred congressional investigations into its enforcement policies and
63
practices. The mounting criticism ultimately led Gonzales to resign
64
from his post as Attorney General.
What can we take away from these events? This recent history certainly illustrates the extent to which the Executive Branch’s prosecutorial discretion is subject to abuse (a topic discussed further in Part
65
IV). But I think we can take away a more positive message as well.
The U.S. Attorney Scandal was a “scandal” because we demand more
from our federal enforcement officials. We expect them to enforce
the law in a fair and evenhanded manner. We expect them to prose66
cute individuals for their conduct and not for their political beliefs.

61

62
63
64
65
66

see also Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 249 (1980) (“In appropriate circumstances
the Court has made clear that traditions of prosecutorial discretion do not immunize
from judicial scrutiny cases in which the enforcement decisions of an administrator were
motivated by improper factors or were otherwise contrary to law.”).
See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1667, 1713 (1975) (“It has become widely accepted . . . that the comparative overrepresentation of regulated or client interests in the process of agency decision results in
a persistent policy bias in favor of these interests.” (footnotes omitted)). Some commentators, however, have voiced doubts about the validity of agency “capture” theory. See, e.g.,
Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1511, 1566 (1992) (asserting that commentators may “overstate the susceptibility of agencies to capture”).
See Dan Eggen, Ex-Attorney General Says Politics Drove Federal Prosecution, WASH. POST, Oct.
24, 2007, at A3.
For a thoughtful discussion of these events, see Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, “The
U.S. Attorneys Scandal” and the Allocation of Prosecutorial Power, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 187 (2008).
See Dan Eggen & Michael A. Fletcher, Embattled Gonzales Resigns: Attorney General Was Criticized for Terrorism Policy, Prosecutor Firings, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 2007, at A1.
See infra notes 172–75 and accompanying text.
Cf. Lara Jakes Jordan, Mukasey Sworn in as Attorney General, ASSOC. PRESS, Nov. 9, 2007 (observing that the newly appointed Attorney General Michael Mukasey “made clear to sena-
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Most importantly, when the Executive Branch fails to properly perform this duty, we have mechanisms to hold it accountable. We can
even force a recalcitrant Attorney General to resign.
Indeed, our legal system has crafted various methods to hold executive enforcement officials accountable for the discretionary decisions that they make in “seeing that federal law is obeyed.” First, executive enforcement decisions are subject to a limited form of judicial
review. Federal courts may examine whether the Executive Branch
has violated the Constitution by selectively targeting persons of a par67
ticular ethnicity or ideology. The courts can also review executive
enforcement decisions that are out of step with a clear statutory
68
mandate.
Executive enforcement decisions are also subject to congressional
oversight. Congress may amend a statute to clarify the Executive
69
Branch’s duties, establishing enforcement priorities or prescribing
the remedies that the Executive Branch is permitted to seek for vari70
ous statutory violations. Congress may also use its appropriations
71
power or hold congressional hearings to exert control over an agency’s enforcement practices (as illustrated by the U.S. Attorney Scan72
dal).
Furthermore, the Executive Branch can itself take measures to cabin the prosecutorial discretion of individual enforcement officials.
It can, for example, provide its employees with manuals that set forth

67
68

69
70

71

72

tors” during his confirmation hearings that he would not “tolerate politics influencing
decisions about prosecuting cases or hiring career attorneys”).
See supra note 60.
An agency’s decision not to take a particular enforcement action is “presumptively unreviewable.” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985). But this presumption “may be
rebutted” when a congressional statute “has provided guidelines for the agency to follow
in exercising its enforcement powers.” See id. at 832–33. Furthermore, federal courts can
review enforcement decisions that are based on (allegedly incorrect) statutory interpretations, such as an agency’s conclusion that it lacks jurisdiction to exercise its enforcement
authority. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 25 (1998).
See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 833.
For example, in the civil regulatory context, Congress sometimes establishes parameters
for the assessment of civil monetary penalties. See 29 U.S.C. § 666(a)–(d) (2006); 12
U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)(A)–(C) (2006).
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement of Federal Law, 49 U. CHI.
L. REV. 394, 418 (1982) (“Congress . . . may use the appropriations process . . . to ensure
that [an] agency does not overenforce a statute, or to indicate that certain . . . illegalities . . . are the intended object of the statutory standard.”).
See Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 791 (1999) (“Oversight hearings . . . give legislators in the
relevant committees the chance to impose costs if enforcers are insufficiently attentive to
their concerns.”).
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74

its enforcement policies, and then conduct internal reviews or take
other measures to prevent officials from bringing suits that are out of
75
step with those policies.
I identify these compliance mechanisms to highlight (as discussed
in Part IV) that no such constraints apply to private prosecutorial discretion. But I do not want to overstate the effectiveness of any of
these forms of review. Judicial review is often an inadequate means
of curtailing executive enforcement discretion. Federal courts rarely
76
review individual nonenforcement decisions, and selective prosecu77
tion claims are extremely difficult to prove. Moreover, Congress
may not have the time, the staff, or the political will to hold oversight
hearings every time it disagrees with an executive enforcement policy,
78
much less an individual enforcement decision. Congress may be
73

74

75

76
77

78

See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 837, 843
(2004) (“Prosecutors’ offices, especially those that deal with a large volume of similar cases, often adopt policies in order to promote consistency and administrative efficiency.”).
This method of restraint does, however, rely on the Executive Branch’s willingness and
capacity to constrain individual enforcement officials. The publication of such guidelines
does not give rise to any individual rights and, accordingly, defendants cannot rely on
those guidelines to challenge individual enforcement decisions in court. See In re Grand
Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he guidelines
provide no enforceable rights to any individuals, but merely guide the discretion of the
prosecutors.”); United States v. Paternostro, 966 F.2d 907, 912 (5th Cir. 1992).
See Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines: A Case Study in
Controlling Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 960 n.303 (2000) (observing that the Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys conducts reviews every few years to ensure that field offices “comply[] with Department policies and procedures”).
Notably, the federal government has a centralized system for determining which cases
should be appealed to the courts of appeals and ultimately to the Supreme Court. See
United States Department of Justice, Functions of the Office of the Solicitor General,
http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/aboutosg/function.html (noting that the Solicitor General’s
Office “review[s] all cases decided adversely to the government in the lower courts to determine whether they should be appealed and, if so, what position should be taken”).
The Solicitor General can use this authority over the appellate process to ensure, to some
degree, consistency in government enforcement efforts. For example, on two occasions,
the Solicitor General successfully moved in the Supreme Court to dismiss criminal prosecutions that were out of step with the federal government’s overall enforcement policies.
See Redmond v. United States, 384 U.S. 264, 264–65 (1966); Petite v. United States, 361
U.S. 529, 530–31 (1960).
See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (holding that an agency’s decision not to
take a particular enforcement action is “presumptively unreviewable”).
See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464–65 (1996) (stating that enforcement
decisions are entitled to a “presumption of regularity” and that, in order to “dispel [that]
presumption,” a person must provide “clear evidence” that the decision was improperly
motivated).
See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for the
Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1424 (2000) (“Traditionally, Congress has used
[oversight] hearings sparingly and for matters of some prominence.”).
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even less inclined to correct executive enforcement decisions by statutory amendment, given the cumbersome nature of the legislative
79
process (and the possibility of presidential veto). The Executive
Branch is likewise subject to budgetary and time constraints that may
hinder its ability to oversee individual enforcement officials (assuming, of course, that it has the political will to conduct such oversight
at all).
Ultimately, no amount of central executive supervision, congressional oversight, or federal court review will fully cabin prosecutorial
discretion—not when officials are charged with the abstract duty to
ensure that “the law is obeyed.” Thus, in the end, we must recognize—as former Attorney General (and Supreme Court Justice) Robert Jackson put it—that we grant our public officials this discretionary enforcement authority, not because we are confident that they
will always exercise it perfectly, but “because it seems necessary that
80
such a power to prosecute be lodged somewhere.” And the Constitution, via the Take Care Clause of Article II, has indicated where we
should “lodge” the power to see that the law is obeyed. The Constitution has designated the Executive Branch as “the guardian of that
81
public interest.”
IV. THE ARTICLE III STANDING OF PRIVATE PLAINTIFFS
It has been well-established for over a century that the Executive
Branch has standing to bring suit in federal court to “see that federal
law is obeyed.” It is equally well-established that private plaintiffs may
not assert such an abstract grievance. As described below, this restriction prevents private plaintiffs from exercising the same degree of
prosecutorial discretion as the Executive Branch.
This concept of standing as a limit on private prosecutorial discretion provides both a principled explanation and a policy rationale for
much of standing doctrine. This analysis also suggests a constitutional and normative justification for standing doctrine that has
largely been overlooked by commentators: standing doctrine pro-

79

80
81

See Kagan, supra note 56, at 2259 (“[A]ll the claims of legislative control [over administrative action] inadequately acknowledge the limits on Congress’s ability to impose harsh
sanctions. Statutory (including most budgetary) punishments require the action of the
full Congress—action which is costly and difficult to accomplish.”).
Jackson, supra note 59, at 3.
United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 27 (1960).
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tects individual liberty against arbitrary exercises of private prosecutorial discretion.
A. Private Parties Must Allege “Something More” Than the “Common
Concern for Obedience to Law”
82

Fairchild v. Hughes provides an early illustration of the Supreme
Court’s unwillingness to hear abstract private grievances. In Fairchild,
the plaintiff challenged the validity of the Nineteenth Amendment
83
(the amendment that gave women the right to vote). The plaintiff
claimed an interest in the case as a citizen and taxpayer and as a
“member[] of the American Constitutional League,” an association
that sought to protect “the fundamental principles of the American
Constitution, and especially that which gives to each state the right to
determine for itself the question as to who should exercise the elec84
tive franchise therein.” The Court dismissed the suit, stating that
the plaintiff asserted “only the right, possessed by every citizen, to re85
quire that the government be administered according to law.” This
“general right,” the Court declared, “[o]bviously . . . does not entitle
86
a private citizen to institute” a suit in federal court.
The Court later applied the same principles to a purely private
87
dispute. In L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., the plaintiffs sought to prevent a railroad from taking action that would (al88
legedly) violate the Transportation Act of 1920. The Court held
that, to bring the action, the plaintiffs had to allege “something more
89
than a common concern for obedience to law.”
90
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife confirmed that this limitation on private party standing has constitutional underpinnings. In Lujan, certain environmental organizations filed suit against the Department of
Interior, challenging its regulatory interpretation of the Endangered

82
83

84
85
86
87
88
89
90

258 U.S. 126 (1922).
See id. at 127; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.”).
Fairchild, 258 U.S. at 127 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 129.
Id. at 129–30.
311 U.S. 295 (1940).
See id. at 297.
Id. at 303.
504 U.S. 555 (1992).
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91

Species Act. After concluding that the plaintiffs failed to allege a
92
cognizable injury, the Court held that the statute’s “citizen-suit” pro93
vision did not provide an alternative basis for standing.
The citizen-suit provision stated that “any person may commence
a civil suit on his own behalf . . . to enjoin any person, including the
United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency . . . who is alleged to be in violation of” any provision of the En94
dangered Species Act or its implementing regulations. The Lujan
Court found that Congress could not, consistent with Article III, confer “upon all persons” this “abstract, self-contained, noninstrumental
95
‘right’” to enforce federal law. The Court declared that a plaintiff
asserting only an injury “to his and every citizen’s interest in proper
application of the Constitution and laws . . . does not state an Article
96
III case or controversy.”
91

92

93
94
95
96

Id. at 557–59. The statutory provision at issue requires each federal agency, in consultation with the Secretary of the Interior, to ensure that any action “authorized, funded, or
carried out by [the] agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any
endangered species.” Id. at 558 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988)). The plaintiffs
in Lujan objected to a regulation stating that this consultation requirement did not apply
to agency action in foreign countries. See id. at 558–59.
See id. at 562–67. The plaintiff organizations’ claim for standing rested in part on affidavits from two members. See id. at 563–64. Each member stated that she had previously
observed an endangered species in a foreign country and that the existence of the species
was now threatened by a project that received federal funds. See id. at 563. Each member
also asserted that she planned to return to the location to view the species again. See id. at
563–64. The Supreme Court held that the affidavits did not establish an injury-in-fact,
because they failed to show that the affiants would “imminent[ly]” be harmed by the
threat to the species. See id. at 564 (internal quotation marks omitted). According to the
Court, the plaintiffs needed to have “concrete plans,” not simply “‘some day’ intentions,”
to return to the foreign countries in order to demonstrate “‘actual or imminent’ injury.”
Id.
See id. at 571–73.
Id. at 571–72 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988)).
See id. at 573.
Id. at 573–74. Lujan did not announce a constitutional rule solely for cases against the
federal government (or, more specifically, against the Executive Branch). The Supreme
Court and the courts of appeals have applied similar principles in lawsuits against nonfederal defendants. See Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 442 (2007) (rejecting a challenge to a Colorado law for lack of standing); L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.,
311 U.S. 295, 303–04 (1940) (holding that the plaintiffs could not challenge the railroad’s conduct based solely on their interest in ensuring compliance with federal law); W.
Pac. Cal. R.R. Co. v. S. Pac. Co., 284 U.S. 47, 51–52 (1931) (stating that to be a party-ininterest, the complainant must have some definite legal right that is seriously threatened); Am. Canoe Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Louisa Water & Sewer Comm’n, 389 F.3d 536,
542, 546–47 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding a concrete and particularized injury sufficient to
confer Article III standing); Crist v. Comm’n on Presidential Debates, 262 F.3d 193, 195
(2d Cir. 2001) (finding no particularized harm to allow standing against the Commission
on Presidential Debates).

Apr. 2009]

NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE

805

The Supreme Court has thus repeatedly found that a private
97
plaintiff must allege “something more” than an interest in “seeing
that the law is obeyed.” But this “something more” cannot simply be
an ideological interest in a particular area of law. In Fairchild v.
Hughes, for example, the Court indicated that the plaintiff could not
challenge the Nineteenth Amendment simply by asserting a special
interest in protecting each State’s alleged “right to determine for itself the question as to who should exercise the elective franchise
98
therein.”
99
The Court made this point more explicit in Sierra Club v. Morton.
In Morton, a private interest group brought suit against the Department of Interior to enjoin it from issuing permits for a development
100
in a wilderness area. The organization asserted that it should have
standing to bring the action in light of its “special interest in the conservation and the sound maintenance of the national parks, game re101
fuges and forests of the country.”
102
The organization’s
The Supreme Court rejected that claim.
“special interest” in environmental protection did not constitute a judicially cognizable interest. The Court stated that, if “a mere interest
in a problem” sufficed for standing, then “any individual citizen” with
a “bona fide special interest” in a particular legal issue could file
103
suit.

97
98
99
100
101
102
103

L. Singer & Sons, 311 U.S. at 303–04.
258 U.S. 126, 127 (1922).
405 U.S. 727 (1972).
See id. at 730.
Id.
See id. at 738–41.
Id. at 739–40 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court purported to adhere to
these limitations on private party standing in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United
States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000). Stevens involved the False Claims Act, which
prohibits any person from making a fraudulent claim for payment to the federal government, and allows private qui tam relators to enforce the provision by filing suit against an
alleged violator. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)(1), 3730(b)(1) (2000); Stevens, 529 U.S. at 768,
771–78. The Court found that relators could (consistent with Article III) bring these
suits, because they asserted the government’s “proprietary injury resulting from the alleged fraud,” rather than its abstract “sovereign[]” interest in law enforcement. Id. at
771, 773 (noting that the statute “can reasonably be regarded as effecting a partial assignment of the Government’s damages claim”(emphasis added)). I do not claim that this
distinction between “sovereign” and “proprietary” interests is necessarily coherent. I note
only that the Court’s analysis is superficially consistent with the cases holding that private
parties lack standing to see that the law is obeyed. A more extensive discussion of Stevens
and the False Claims Act is beyond the scope of this Article.
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B. Standing Doctrine Curtails Private Prosecutorial Discretion
The Supreme Court has never clearly identified the basis for the
prohibition on abstract private grievances. But the Court’s analysis in
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
104
& State, Inc. suggests one concern that may be animating the Court:
a concern that certain classes of injuries could give private individuals
105
an unlimited amount of prosecutorial discretion.
In Valley Forge, a private interest group that advocates the separation of church and state, along with several of its employees, filed
suit, challenging the federal government’s decision to convey federal
106
property to a religious institution.
The Supreme Court held that
the plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to assert an injury107
in-fact. The plaintiffs could not simply claim that “the Constitution
108
has been violated.”
Nor could they rely on a “special interest” in
the Establishment Clause. The Court concluded, as it had in Sierra
Club v. Morton, that the plaintiffs’ “firm[] commit[ment] to the constitutional principle of separation of church and State” was not in and
109
of itself sufficient for standing.
Notably, the Court in Valley Forge seemed particularly disturbed by
the fact that the plaintiffs were from the Washington, D.C. area and
were challenging the conveyance of property located in Pennsyl110
vania.
The Court emphasized that the plaintiffs only knew of the
allegedly unconstitutional transfer of property because of a “news re111
lease.”
The Court found that the plaintiffs had no cognizable in104
105

106
107
108
109

110
111

454 U.S. 464 (1982).
Standing doctrine may, of course, also serve other values. For insightful discussions, see
Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the “Case or Controversy” Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 306–15 (1979) (arguing that standing protects the values
of representation and self-determination); Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good for,
93 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1664 (2007) (contending that standing helps “prevent the inefficient
disposition of constitutional entitlements”); and MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL
PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 159 (2000)
(asserting that standing helps prevent litigants “from strategically timing cases . . . to manipulate the substantive evolution of constitutional doctrine”).
454 U.S. at 469.
See id. at 482–87.
Id. at 485.
Id. at 486 (“It is evident that [the plaintiffs] are firmly committed to the constitutional
principle of separation of church and State, but standing is not measured by the intensity
of the litigant’s interest or the fervor of his advocacy.”).
See id. at 486–87.
See id. at 469 (observing that the plaintiffs “learned of the conveyance through a news release”); id. at 486–87 (“[The plaintiffs] complain of a transfer of property located in
Chester County, Pa. The named plaintiffs reside in Maryland and Virginia; their organiza-
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terest in this distant conduct: they could not, simply by alleging a
constitutional violation, confer upon themselves “a special license to
roam the country in search of governmental wrongdoing” and “reveal
112
their discoveries in federal court.”
1. The Prosecutorial Discretion Conferred by “Abstract Concerns”
The Court’s analysis in Valley Forge suggests the missing link in
much of standing doctrine. The Court indicated that a private plaintiff may not assert an injury that would allow her to “roam the country
in search of” legal violations and initiate an enforcement action
against the violator of her choice. Put another way, a private plaintiff
should not be permitted to file suit against any person, anywhere in
the country, for any violation of law. The Court thus suggested that a
private plaintiff should not have standing to assert an injury that
would give her an unlimited amount of prosecutorial discretion.
What kinds of injuries would confer on a private plaintiff substantial prosecutorial discretion? One such injury appears to be the “injury to the interest in seeing that the law is obeyed.” As we have seen,
the Executive Branch, in pursuing that law enforcement interest, has
precisely the degree of prosecutorial discretion that the Court found
impermissible for a private party. The Executive Branch may “roam
the country in search of” legal violations and bring suit against any
person for any transgression. There are certain legal and political
constraints on executive enforcement discretion, but (as discussed
below) virtually none of those limitations apply to private parties. Accordingly, if a private party could assert the “interest in seeing that
the law [was] obeyed,” she would have almost unlimited power to
“roam the country in search of” legal violations and pursue the violator of her choice.
But that is not the only abstract grievance that would give a private
plaintiff such expansive prosecutorial discretion. Other abstract interests would give private plaintiffs a similar degree of discretionary
enforcement authority. As discussed, the Court in Sierra Club v. Morton and Valley Forge held that private parties lack standing to assert a
“special interest” in—or a “firm[] commit[ment]” to—the enforcement of a particular area of law. The Supreme Court applied these

112

tional headquarters are located in Washington, D.C.
through a news release.” (footnote omitted)).
Id. at 487.

They learned of the transfer
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113

principles in Diamond v. Charles, when it held that a litigant could
114
not simply allege a “conscientious objection to abortion.” Such an
“abstract concern,” the Court declared, “does not substitute for the
115
concrete injury required by Art. III.”
If a plaintiff had Article III standing to assert a “conscientious objection” to particular conduct (or a “special interest” in a particular
area of law), there would seem to be no Article III means of limiting
her discretion to file suit in federal court. It does not appear that a
federal court would ever have an “objective basis” for rejecting a
would-be plaintiff’s assertion that she had a “bona fide” “special in116
terest” in a particular matter.
Thus, if a private plaintiff had standing to file suit, based solely on
her own asserted “special interest,” she could become a selfappointed enforcer of any area of federal law. And she would have
an extraordinary degree of prosecutorial discretion. Her asserted
“special interest” would allow her to bring suit against any person, anywhere in the country, for any violation of her chosen field of federal
law.
2. Standing Limits Private Prosecutorial Discretion
We will soon explore why it may make sense to prevent private
parties from exercising substantial prosecutorial discretion. But we
should first examine how standing doctrine curtails private prosecutorial discretion. A private individual generally cannot file suit unless

113
114
115

116

476 U.S. 54 (1986).
Id. at 67.
Id. (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 (1976)). Diamond grew
out of a constitutional challenge to a restrictive Illinois abortion statute. See id. at 57–58.
A physician (Diamond) intervened in the litigation, asserting that he had an interest in
defending the statute because of his “conscientious objection to abortions.” Id. The lower courts later enjoined the enforcement of certain provisions of the state law and Illinois
declined to further defend the statute. See id. at 61. Only Diamond sought review in the
Supreme Court. Id. The Court held that, when a private intervenor such as Diamond is
the sole party to appeal, he must satisfy the standing requirements of Article III. See id. at
68. And, as noted in the text, the Court found that Diamond lacked standing because he
suffered no judicially cognizable injury. See id. at 71.
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739–40 (1972) (“[I]f a ‘special interest’ in [environmental protection] were enough to entitle the Sierra Club to commence this litigation, there would appear to be no objective basis upon which to disallow a suit by any
other bona fide ‘special interest’ organization, however small or short-lived. And if any
group with a bona fide ‘special interest’ could initiate such litigation, it is difficult to perceive why any individual citizen with the same bona fide special interest would not also be
entitled to do so.”).
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117

she has suffered a concrete injury-in-fact. That injury further cabins
her prosecutorial discretion by defining which defendants she can
hale into court. She can sue only the party (or parties) that caused
118
the legally cognizable harm. And she can seek redress (in the form
of damages or injunctive relief) only for the harm that she suffered
119
and/or to prevent that harm from occurring or recurring. The injury-in-fact requirement of standing doctrine thus, to a large extent,
determines the scope of a plaintiff’s prosecutorial discretion.
Let’s examine how the Supreme Court has managed to curtail
private prosecutorial discretion, even as it has relaxed the standing
requirements for private plaintiffs. As noted, a private plaintiff may
bring suit only when she suffers an injury-in-fact. Accordingly, when
the Court recognizes new injuries as judicially cognizable, that increases the likelihood that a private party can file suit. And, over the
past several decades, the Court has expanded the realm of injuries to
120
121
encompass vote dilution, racial gerrymandering, an aesthetic in122
terest in a wilderness area, and an interest in the preservation of a
123
species of wildlife.
But, even as the Court has recognized new injuries-in-fact, it has
124
(albeit imperfectly ) consistently defined the relevant injury in a way
that cabins private prosecutorial discretion. The Court, as an initial
matter, defines the injury in a manner that limits the pool of potential prosecutors. Often, the parameters established by the Court are
117
118

119

120
121
122
123
124

See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 225 (2003).
See, e.g., Simon, 426 U.S. at 40–44 (holding that indigent plaintiffs, who were denied
treatment at certain tax-exempt hospitals, lacked standing to sue the Internal Revenue
Service, because their injury—the denial of care—was caused by the hospital rather than
by the IRS); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617–18 (1973) (holding that a mother
could not bring suit against a state prosecutor for failing to enforce the child support laws
on behalf of children born out-of-wedlock, because the mother “made no showing that
her failure to secure support payments [from her own child’s father] result[ed] from the
nonenforcement”).
See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000) (“[A]
plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought.”). I do not
mean to dispute that, once a private plaintiff demonstrates an injury-in-fact, she may seek
“broad injunctive relief” or other remedies that are “not necessarily coterminous with”
her personal injury. See Morrison, supra note 11, at 603–04. But she must nevertheless
target the particular illegal conduct that injured her. See infra text accompanying notes
124–35.
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 207–08 (1962).
See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993).
See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 183; Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438
U.S. 59, 73–74, 74 n.18 (1978).
See Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 n.4 (1986).
For insightful critiques of the Court’s standing jurisprudence, see supra notes 5–7, 27.
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geographic. In the racial gerrymandering context, for example, the
plaintiff must reside in one of the (allegedly poorly drawn) majority125
minority districts. Likewise, in the vote dilution context, the plaintiff must reside in the area where her votes will (allegedly) be ac126
corded less weight.
The definition of the relevant injury-in-fact then determines the
scope of each potential plaintiff’s prosecutorial discretion. A plaintiff
who brings a vote dilution claim has the discretion to file suit only
against the governmental entity that drew the (allegedly unlawful)
district lines. And she can challenge—and seek redress for—only the
alleged vote dilution. She lacks standing to see that all aspects of
election law are obeyed.
Along similar lines, in environmental cases, the Court has defined
each injury in a way that limits both the pool of potential prosecutors,
and cabins each potential plaintiff’s prosecutorial discretion. To
some extent, as in the voting rights context, the parameters established by the Court are geographic. An individual can generally file
an enforcement action if she resides near a facility that has allegedly
polluted the surrounding air or water, claiming that the pollution has
adversely affected her health or negatively impacted the value of her
127
property. The Court has also focused on “actual use,” i.e., whether
a complaining individual regularly spends time in a particular wil128
derness area or views a particular endangered species.
The definition of the relevant injury then, in turn, determines the
prosecutorial discretion of any would-be plaintiff. The affected individual can bring suit against only the particular defendant (or defen-

125
126
127

128

See Sinkfield v. Kelley, 531 U.S. 28, 29–31 (2000); United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737,
744–45 (1995).
See Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 330–34 (1999);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 207–08 (1962).
See Laidlaw., 528 U.S. at 182–84 (holding that an environmental organization had standing, in part because a member of the organization lived near the defendant hazardous
waste facility and alleged that the pollution caused by the facility reduced the value of her
property); Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 67, 73–74 (concluding that the plaintiffs—“40 individuals who live within close proximity to the planned [nuclear power] facilities”—alleged a
cognizable injury, given that the emissions from such facilities can cause adverse “health
and genetic consequences”).
See, e.g., Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 183 (“[E]nvironmental plaintiffs adequately allege injury in
fact when they aver that they use the affected area and are persons ‘for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be lessened’ by the challenged activity.”
(quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972))); Japan Whaling, 478 U.S. at
230 n.4 (noting that the plaintiffs “undoubtedly have alleged a sufficient ‘injury in fact’ in
that the whale watching and studying of their members will be adversely affected by continued whale harvesting”).

Apr. 2009]

NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE

811

dants) whose conduct has harmed (or threatens to harm) her health;
the value of her property; the wilderness area that she uses; or the
species that she enjoys viewing. She lacks standing to “roam the
country in search of” other violations of environmental laws—even
other violations by the same defendant—and “reveal [her] discoveries in federal court.”
This analysis helps to explain the Court’s willingness to consider
certain establishment clause challenges on the merits, even as it de129
nied standing to the plaintiffs in Valley Forge. The Court has, for example, ruled on allegations that local government crèche and Ten
Commandments displays violate the Establishment Clause—without
130
so much as mentioning standing.
Significantly, the plaintiffs who
brought these suits had more than just an abstract interest in preventing government endorsement of religion. Each suit was brought in
part by local residents who lived near and actually observed the chal131
lenged religious displays. The plaintiffs thus had the discretion to
contest only the particular display in their community and to seek redress only for that harm. These plaintiffs were not given the more
general authority to “see that [the Establishment Clause] is ob132
eyed.”

129
130

131

132

Many thanks to Richard Fallon for suggesting this application of the standing theory presented here.
See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 850, 881 (2005) (holding that a Ten Commandments display on a county courthouse violates the Establishment Clause); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 691–92 (2005) (holding that a Ten Commandments display on
state capitol grounds does not violate the Establishment Clause); County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 621 (1989) (holding that a crèche display at a county courthouse is
unconstitutional); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (holding that a city’s
crèche display is constitutional).
See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 682; Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 587–88; Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671–72;
ACLU v. McCreary County, 96 F. Supp. 2d 679, 682 (E.D. Ky. 2000) (“[T]he plaintiffs
here have standing because they must come into contact with the display of the Ten
Commandments whenever they enter the courthouse to conduct business.”).
I do not separately discuss establishment clause challenges based on taxpayer standing,
which are governed by distinct rules. The general rule is that private parties lack standing
to challenge government conduct based solely on their status as federal taxpayers. See
Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923). Although the Court in Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83 (1968), carved out an exception to this rule for establishment clause challenges to federal expenditures, the Court has gradually narrowed the Flast exception so
that it covers only challenges to certain exercises of congressional power under the
Spending Clause. See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2568
(2007) (holding that federal taxpayers may challenge only government expenditures that
are “expressly authorized or mandated by a[] specific congressional enactment”). A full
discussion of taxpayer standing is beyond the scope of this Article. But, as noted below,
the constitutional analysis here may offer an alternative rationale for the Court’s decision
to grant standing in Flast and deny it in Valley Forge. See infra note 210.
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Private organizations do tend to have a larger degree of prosecutorial discretion than an individual plaintiff. A private interest group
may bring an enforcement action against any defendant whose conduct has injured one of the organization’s members, as long as the
133
lawsuit is germane to its purposes.
An organization with a nationwide membership will often be able to satisfy this requirement, and
will therefore retain the prosecutorial discretion to pursue a number
of offenses (and/or offenders). For example, in Sierra Club v. Morton,
the Supreme Court found that the plaintiff organization lacked
standing to challenge a recreational development near a wilderness
area, based solely on its “special interest” in environmental protec134
tion.
But, the Court indicated, the organization could have
brought the identical suit if it had alleged that one of its members
would be harmed by the development (perhaps because that person
135
lived near the wilderness area and hiked there).
The prosecutorial discretion of such a private interest group is
still, however, not coextensive with that of the Executive Branch. A
private organization is limited to filing suits against defendants whose
conduct harms the interests of the organization’s members. Thus,
like an individual plaintiff, a private organization lacks Article III
standing to “roam the country in search of” any violation of federal
law (or even a particular subset of federal law) and “reveal [its] discoveries in federal court.”

133

See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977) (“[A]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would
otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are
germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief
requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.”); see also United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544,
556–57 (1996) (concluding that the third prong of this test is not a constitutional requirement). Notably, the standard for “germaneness” is not a particularly exacting one.
See Nat’l Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 233 F.3d 625, 636 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

134

405 U.S. 727, 738–40 (1972).

135

See id. at 735 (“Nowhere in the pleadings or affidavits did the [Sierra] Club state that its
members use [the wilderness area].”); id. at 735 n.8 (noting that the plaintiff could seek
leave to amend its complaint to allege such an injury). Indeed, it appears that the plaintiff in Morton could have satisfied the requirements for organizational standing. According to an amicus brief, the plaintiff organization did have members that used the wilderness area at issue. See id. The organization, however, declined to rely on the interests of
its members. See id.
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C. Policy Bases for Curtailing Private Prosecutorial Discretion
But why would we place these limitations on private enforcement
actions? After all, private attorneys general often perform a valuable
law enforcement function. Private actions (when they proceed to the
merits) can and plainly do help serve the public interest in “seeing
136
that the law is obeyed,” whether it be in the civil rights context; the
137
environmental context; or the commercial context (especially with
138
139
respect to antitrust and securities law).
Moreover, it seems quite possible that conferring standing on an
unlimited number of private prosecutors to “see that the law is obeyed” would be a way to solve some of the law enforcement difficulties faced by the Executive Branch. As noted above, the Executive
Branch lacks sufficient financial resources to pursue every violation of
federal law; millions of private attorneys general should be able to
pick up much of the slack. Indeed, private plaintiffs that are able to
satisfy the requirements of current standing law often perform that
140
very function.
But we should keep in mind that private attorneys general do not
constitute (and should not have to constitute) a cohesive group,
working together in pursuit of a common public goal. Thus, in evaluating the prosecutorial capacities of private attorneys general, each
must be considered a separate and distinct entity. And, once we look
at would-be private plaintiffs on this individual basis, we can see policy reasons for preventing every private party in the country from ex-

136

137

138

139

140

See Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972); Newman v. Piggie Park
Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401 (1968) (“When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it
was evident that . . . the Nation would have to rely in part upon private litigation as a
means of securing broad compliance with the law.”).
See Sandra B. Zellmer, The Virtues of ‘Command and Control’ Regulation: Barring Exotic Species
from Aquatic Ecosystems, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1233, 1267 (noting the importance of private
enforcement of environmental laws).
See Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 572 n.10 (1982)
(“[P]rivate suits are an important element of the Nation’s antitrust enforcement effort:
. . . ‘[They] provide a significant supplement to the limited resources available to the Department of Justice for enforcing the antitrust laws and deterring violations.’” (quoting
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (1979))); 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006) (authorizing
private antitrust actions).
See Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 310 (1985) (“[I]mplied
private actions provide ‘a most effective weapon in the enforcement’ of the securities laws
and are ‘a necessary supplement to [Securities & Exchange] Commission action’” (quoting J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964))).
See supra notes 136–39; Stephenson, supra note 53, at 107–08.
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ercising the same degree of prosecutorial discretion as the Executive
Branch.
1. A Hypothetical Private Attorney General
Let’s examine whether a private plaintiff, who brings an enforcement action, means to serve as a “representative of the [entire] pub141
lic.” Assume for a moment that we have conferred upon a private
attorney general Article III standing to see that an area of federal law
is obeyed. We will use bankruptcy law as a paradigm. Assume that
our private attorney general (a private nonprofit organization) chose
this field because of its “special interest” in protecting lower-level
employees who are adversely affected by corporate reorganizations.
To facilitate our private attorney general’s “special interest,” we will
allow it to “roam the country in search of” violations of the Bank142
ruptcy Code and “reveal [its] discoveries in federal court.”
But, of course, like the Executive Branch, our private attorney
general will have only a finite amount of resources to pursue these
legal violations. Thus, like the Executive Branch, the private attorney
general must choose which statutory violations to pursue. Presumably, it will focus on the violations that relate to its “special interest”:
protecting the employees of corporate debtors. Accordingly, our private attorney general will be motivated to bring suit against any corporate debtor that fails to comply with the statutory provisions pro143
tecting employees’ collective bargaining agreements and retirement
144
benefits.
But our private attorney general may not spend its limited resources enforcing statutory provisions that do not further its “special
interest.” For example, the Bankruptcy Code requires a corporate
debtor to pay its post-petition contractors before paying virtually any
145
other creditor. This is clearly an important requirement of the
141
142
143

144
145

Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 736 (1972).
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 487 (1982).
See 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (b)(1)(A) (2006) (stating that a debtor may modify a collective bargaining agreement only as “necessary to permit . . . reorganization” and must ensure that
“all of the affected parties are treated fairly and equitably”).
See 11 U.S.C. § 1114(e)(1) (2006) (requiring that the debtor “timely pay and . . . not modify” retirement benefits except by agreement of the parties or by court order).
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 503(b), 507(a)(2) (stating that such expenses are “administrative expenses,” which are given high priority under the Code); Chao v. Hosp. Staffing Servs.,
Inc., 270 F.3d 374, 383 (6th Cir. 2001). Such “administrative expenses” also include the
post-petition wages of a debtor corporation’s employees. See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A)(i).
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Code. The debtor could not reorganize if it could not obtain the
goods and services to conduct its business; and, without such a promise of payment, other companies would be disinclined to do business
146
with a debtor in bankruptcy. But the payment of such expenses reduces the amount available to other creditors, including the employees and former employees of the debtor corporation. Thus, if a
debtor fails to pay one of its post-petition contractors, our private attorney general is unlikely to pursue that statutory violation, which
does not serve—and, in fact, tends to undermine—its “special interest.”
The Bankruptcy Code, like most federal law, reflects a wide range
of interests, not all of which are consistent with—or even particularly
relevant to—our private attorney general’s own “special interest.”
Our private attorney general has no interest in using its scarce resources to see that every provision of the Bankruptcy Code is obeyed.
This reasoning is not limited to the bankruptcy context. We likewise do not expect an organization focused on environmental protection to pursue just “any” violation of federal environmental law. Such
an organization is not likely to file suit on behalf of a corporation
whose request for a permit to discharge pollutants under the Clean
147
Water Act may have been improperly denied.
Such an improper
denial would constitute “any” violation of federal environmental law
and, indeed, it may be a violation that Congress would want pursued.
Nevertheless, a permit denial is not a transgression that we expect to
trigger a lawsuit by a private conservation group. On the contrary, we
expect—indeed, many of us hope—that such a group will bring enforcement actions to further its “special interest in the conservation
and the sound maintenance of the national parks, game refuges and
148
forests of the country.”
2. The Lack of Constraints on Private Prosecutorial Discretion
The above discussion suggests some important differences between the Executive Branch and private parties, which help explain

146
147

148

Our private attorney general would be inclined to ensure that a debtor made those payments.
See In re FBI Distrib. Corp., 330 F.3d 36, 41 (1st Cir. 2003).
Under the Clean Water Act, a person that plans to discharge pollutants into the nation’s
waters must apply to the Environmental Protection Agency for a “national pollution discharge elimination system” (“NPDES”) permit. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342 (2000).
An applicant may seek review of an adverse decision. See id. § 1369(b)(1)(F).
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 730 (1972).
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why our legal system places greater limitations on private prosecutorial discretion. First, in contrast to the Executive Branch, a private
party has no constitutional obligation to “faithfully” execute the laws.
Accordingly, a private party is free to ignore certain provisions of law
and refuse to enforce them when they do not comport with its “special interest.” Likewise, a private party has no duty to adopt nationally uniform enforcement policies. A private party is free to focus on
tobacco litigation in Virginia or immigration rights in Arizona, and
need not consider how those actions will affect overall enforcement
efforts.
Nor do we expect a private party to abide by what I have described
as the “nondiscrimination” principle. Certainly, no one complains
that a private organization might be “captured” by a special interest
or that it may bring suits to advance only certain ideological goals.
Indeed, those are the defining features of a private interest group.
But private parties are also free to ignore the other half of the nondiscrimination principle articulated above. Although the Constitution prohibits the Executive Branch from targeting ideological opponents or individuals of a particular ethnicity, these restrictions do not
149
apply to private prosecutorial discretion. In Federal Election Commis150
sion v. Akins, for example, a group of plaintiff voters brought suit
against the FEC, urging it to require the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (“AIPAC”) to make certain disclosures about its po151
litical activities. As the Court observed, the plaintiffs sought the information about AIPAC because they “often opposed” the political
152
positions taken by AIPAC. The Court did not suggest that there was
anything unlawful about a private enforcement action motivated by
the plaintiffs’ ideological opposition to a particular group.
Private parties’ freedom from these constitutional restrictions
would raise troubling possibilities if they had the authority to see that
any area of federal law was obeyed. A private group might, for example, assert a “conscientious objection” to undocumented workers, and
therefore declare a “special interest” in enforcing federal immigration law. Like the private attorneys general discussed above, this self149

150
151
152

The Constitution, with a few exceptions (such as the Thirteenth Amendment), restricts
only the actions of governmental entities. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500
U.S. 614, 619 (1991). The conduct of private parties “violates the Constitution only when
it may be attributed to state action.” Id.; see Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163,
171–73, 177 (1972).
524 U.S. 11 (1998).
See id. at 13–16.
Id. at 15–16.
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appointed watchdog of immigration law would have only a finite
amount of resources, and would thus focus only on the parts of immigration law that furthered its “special interest.” Accordingly, the
interest group would likely concentrate on the statutory provisions
153
requiring removal of certain aliens, and would be less concerned
about the laws permitting other immigrants to remain in the country
154
as refugees.
Alternatively, as in Diamond v. Charles, a private plaintiff might as155
sert a “conscientious objection to abortions,” and therefore claim a
“special interest” in enforcing restrictions on federal funding of abor156
tions. Conversely, a private interest group might assert a “conscientious objection” to persons who interfere with family planning services, and thus claim a “special interest” in enforcing the Freedom of
157
Access to Clinics Entrances Act.
Such a private attorney general
might be inclined to use its finite resources to enforce this law against
members of pro-life interest groups, because—analogous to Federal
Election Commission v. Akins—its views are “often opposed” to such
groups. There do not appear to be any legal constraints on such
158
ideologically motivated private enforcement actions.
And that leads us to the final distinction between the Executive
Branch and private parties: accountability. I do not dispute that it is
difficult to hold the Executive Branch accountable for its discretionary enforcement decisions. But, as challenging as it is to hold the Ex153
154
155
156

157
158

See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2000) (setting forth the classes of deportable aliens).
See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(1)(A) (2006) (providing that an individual who
qualifies as a “refugee” may be granted asylum).
476 U.S. 54, 57–58 (1986).
Since 1976, Congress has, via either an appropriations measure or a joint resolution, prohibited the use of federal Medicaid funds for abortions. This restriction is commonly
known as the “Hyde Amendment.” See Pub. L. No. 108–99, §§ 508, 509, 118 Stat. 277
(2004) (prohibiting the use of federal Medicaid funds for abortion except in cases of
rape, incest, and when the mother’s life would be endangered by the pregnancy); Harris
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 302 (1980); see also id. at 326–27 (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the funding restriction).
18 U.S.C. § 248 (2006). The statute prohibits the “intentional[] . . . intimidat[ion]” of
persons “obtaining or providing reproductive health services.” Id. § 248(a)(1).
Other commentators have raised similar concerns. See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as
Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1445 (2003) (“Private delegates’ exemption from
constitutional constraints means that they can wield these government powers in ways
that raise serious abuse of power concerns. Imagine, for example, an individual who
commences a meritless suit for civil penalties against a company out of spite or because its
owners are African American.”); see also Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 23, at 731 (observing, with respect to qui tam actions, that “there are obvious dangers in a system that
permits prosecutorial discretion to reside in each of 250 million autonomous decisionmakers who are self-appointed and out for their own financial gain”).
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ecutive Branch accountable, it would be far more difficult to constrain the prosecutorial discretion of a private party, if she too could
bring suit to see that the law was obeyed.
Virtually none of the checks on executive enforcement discretion
apply to private parties. Private enforcement decisions are not subject to judicial review for the simple reason that there are no constitu159
tional or other legal restrictions to enforce. Nor are there political
constraints. Private parties clearly need not abide by any enforcement guidelines issued by the Executive Branch. Nor are they subject
160
to the congressional appropriations process. In fact, the only constraint that would seem to apply to both the Executive Branch and
private parties is a change in the law. Given the time-consuming nature of the legislative process, it seems doubtful that Congress would
narrow a statute solely to curtail private prosecutorial discretion. But,
even in the (unlikely) event that Congress took that step, it would
have only a limited effect. A private party would still have the authority to sue any person for any violation of the (somewhat narrowed)
provision. Indeed, the other checks on the Executive Branch’s enforcement discretion are critical precisely because statutes themselves
do not significantly limit that discretion.
Some may argue that private enforcement actions can themselves
161
serve as a check on executive enforcement discretion. Private parties may bring suit against private entities that have gone unnoticed
by (or, worse, have captured) the relevant administrative agency. Alternatively, private parties might bring suit directly against an agency,
urging it to change its enforcement policies or to do a better job of
enforcing certain provisions of law. Private actions can thereby serve
not only to supplement, but to compensate for, lax executive enforcement efforts. This is undoubtedly a strong argument in favor of
private enforcement of the law. But it is not an argument for private
prosecutorial discretion. Indeed, this argument seems to presume
159

See Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 62, 104 (1990) (“Delegations
to private attorneys general . . . are immune from most external supervision—judicial
oversight does not extend to their motives or strategy.”).

160

See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 39–40 (1975) (observing that, although “the annual appropriations hearing affords the legislature an opportunity to assure that [an] agency has not strayed too far,”
“[t]here is no corresponding check in private enforcement”).

161

See Sunstein, supra note 7, at 647 (arguing that Congress may authorize private enforcement actions because it has “concluded that the agency (or private defendant) is not entirely reliable on its own and that relevant people should have access to the courts in order to ensure that the . . . law is enforced”).
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that the Executive Branch will abuse its immense enforcement discretion—that it will favor certain groups, while disfavoring others, or enforce certain laws, while neglecting others—and that such abuse is a
bad thing. Such an argument, which rests on concerns about the
abuse of prosecutorial discretion, does not seem to justify giving every
private individual and organization the same degree of prosecutorial
discretion.
Some commentary suggests that Congress could pass legislation to
162
curtail private prosecutorial discretion.
But it may be difficult for
Congress to require private parties to adhere to the same requirements as the Executive Branch, without running afoul of other constitutional constraints. For example, the First Amendment protects
private parties’ interest in selectively enforcing the law, bringing suits
163
solely to advance their ideological “special interests.” Accordingly,
Congress could not easily restrict private parties’ authority to pick
and choose among the laws that they enforce. The First Amendment
may also limit Congress’s power to regulate ideologically motivated
lawsuits; it is doubtful that a statute reading “no suit may be brought
against a plaintiff’s ideological opponent” would pass constitutional
muster. In any event, as one commentator observes, it seems unlikely
that Congress would enact any such restrictions on private prosecuto164
rial discretion.
Given the lack of alternative constraints, standing
doctrine seems to serve a useful purpose by curtailing private prosecutorial discretion.
Notably, the problem to be addressed is not private enforcement
of the law. Private parties who demonstrate an injury-in-fact often
serve the public interest in seeing that the law is obeyed, and such
lawsuits should be encouraged. But it does not seem that every private
individual and organization in the country should have the discretion
to sue any person for any legal violation. Standing doctrine (correctly, in my view) permits the former but prohibits the latter. It may
162

See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 587
(2000) (“Congress could extend the procedural requirements of the [Administrative Procedure Act]—or any other good-government statute—to private actors.”).

163

See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429–30 (1963) (concluding that a lawsuit can itself be
“a form of political expression” protected by the First Amendment and “may well be the
sole practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for redress of grievances”); see also
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (observing that the First Amendment’s Free
Speech Clause protects the “freedom to associate with others for the common advancement of political beliefs and ideas”).

164

See Freeman, supra note 162, at 591 (“Congress and the states will likely balk at excessively
proceduralizing private institutions. In short, private actors will escape most traditional
constraints most of the time.”).
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be troubling that the Executive Branch exercises considerable prosecutorial discretion in fulfilling its constitutional duty to enforce federal law. But at least the Executive Branch is subject to a degree of
judicial and congressional oversight. It seems unwise to transfer such
discretionary enforcement authority to a private party that is “unencumbered by the legal and practical checks” that constrain “public
165
enforcement agencies.”
D. A Constitutional Foundation for Standing Doctrine
To state the policy rationale for standing doctrine is also to suggest its constitutional justification. Much of our constitutional struc166
ture is designed “to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.” The
term “arbitrary,” as used here, refers to the improper exercise of discretionary power, i.e., random, uneven, or discriminatory decisionmaking. The Constitution in various respects prohibits the government itself from acting arbitrarily: Several provisions of the Bill of
Rights are enforced by prophylactic rules that constrain administrative discretion, and thereby seek to prevent arbitrary exercises of dis167
cretion.

165

Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 678, 679–80 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (observing that, under California law, private parties may bring certain
suits “even though they themselves have suffered no harm,” and expressing concern that
such plaintiffs “potentially constitute a large and hostile crowd freely able to bring prosecutions designed to vindicate their beliefs, and to do so unencumbered by the legal and
practical checks” on “public enforcement agencies”); see also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Co., 473 U.S. 479, 504 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (observing that, in private suits
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, “the restraining influence of [public] prosecutors is completely absent”).

166

Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

167

Arbitrary exercises of discretion are prohibited by the First Amendment’s Free Speech
Clause, see City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757, 772 (1988) (invalidating a licensing scheme that gave the mayor “unfettered discretion” to deny permit
applications for news racks); the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures, see Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653–54 (1979) (stating that
the Fourth Amendment “impose[s] a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of
discretion by government officials . . . to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals
against arbitrary invasions” (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted)); the Due
Process Clause, see City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56, 60–64 (1999) (invalidating
a local ordinance that failed to “establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement”
and thereby created a significant “potential for arbitrary enforcement”); and the Equal
Protection Clause, see Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (stating
that the Equal Protection Clause protects against “intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution
through duly constituted agents”).
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The Constitution also proscribes arbitrary action in another way.
It prohibits the government from delegating certain discretionary
functions to nongovernmental actors. Various constitutional rules—
168
ranging from the Article I nondelegation doctrine to the due proc169
ess and establishment clause contexts —prohibit the government (at
170
least in theory ) from delegating broad discretionary power to private parties.
I assert that similar principles apply to the Take Care Clause of Article II, at least insofar as it requires the Executive Branch to exercise
the broad prosecutorial discretion to “see that federal law is ob171
eyed.”
Such discretion creates a significant potential for abuse,
even when it is exercised by a governmental entity that is subject to
constitutional and other legal and political constraints. Such concerns would only be heightened in the context of private prosecutorial discretion, because private parties are subject to virtually none of
those restrictions. Accordingly, the Constitution does not permit the
delegation of such expansive discretionary enforcement authority to
private parties.
This Article II nondelegation principle provides a constitutional
explanation for much of Article III standing doctrine. Standing ensures that private parties cannot exercise the broad prosecutorial discretion that the Executive Branch exercises when it enforces federal
law. Standing doctrine, in short, enforces the Article II nondelegation doctrine by curtailing private prosecutorial discretion.

168

169

170

171

See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 521–22, 537 (1935) (invalidating the National Industrial Recovery Act, which permitted private trade and industrial associations to create codes of fair competition for much of the economy); see also
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424 (1944) (stating that the problem in Schechter was
that “[t]he function of formulating the codes was delegated, not to a public official responsible to Congress or the Executive, but to private individuals engaged in the industries to be regulated”).
See Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 117, 125–27 (1982) (invalidating on Establishment Clause grounds a state law that permitted churches to veto applications for
liquor licenses, and stating that “important, discretionary governmental powers” may not
be “delegated to or shared with religious institutions”); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S.
238, 310–11 (1936) (invalidating on due process grounds the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act, which delegated rulemaking authority to coal producers and miners).
The Article I nondelegation doctrine serves largely as a “theoretical” prohibition because,
as many commentators have observed, courts have not found a judicially manageable
standard for enforcing it. See, e.g., John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon
of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 223, 241–42 (2000) (noting that there is no “reliable metric” for determining when “a statute confers too much discretion”).
I do not argue that other Article II functions are nondelegable. Such a claim is beyond
the scope of this Article.
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1. An Article II Nondelegation Doctrine
The Take Care Clause imposes a duty upon the Executive Branch
to see that federal law is obeyed. That provision thus also requires
the Executive Branch to exercise the degree of prosecutorial discretion necessary to fulfill that law enforcement function. That is an
immense responsibility. The authority to “see that federal law is obeyed” allows the Executive Branch to sue any person, anywhere in the
country, for any legal violation. To have even a semblance of a coherent enforcement system, the Executive Branch must translate that
broad authority into more concrete enforcement policies. Then each
individual executive enforcement official must apply those policies in
particular cases. Throughout this process, executive enforcement officials must make discretionary judgment calls as they determine
which of the innumerable violations of federal law to pursue in federal court.
The Take Care Clause not only imposes this discretionary law enforcement responsibility on the Executive Branch. It also prohibits
Congress and the Executive Branch from delegating that authority to
private parties. Private parties may not exercise the broad prosecutorial discretion that inevitably accompanies the authority to see that
federal law is obeyed.
This Article II nondelegation doctrine is rooted in a central premise of our constitutional order: the need for structural checks against
the exercise of arbitrary power. As the commentary on executive enforcement discretion makes clear, the degree of prosecutorial discretion involved in seeing that federal law is obeyed creates a serious potential for abuse.
Justice Jackson aptly observed that “[l]aw
172
enforcement is not automatic. It isn’t blind.”
Instead, it depends
on the judgments of individual enforcement officials, who have tremendous leeway to choose the targets of their enforcement actions.
And, although executive enforcement officials are supposed to exercise their discretion in an evenhanded and nondiscriminatory manner, the authority to sue any person for any violation of federal law
allows them to act in a far less reputable fashion:
If the prosecutor is obliged to choose his cases, it follows that he can
choose his defendants. Therein is the most dangerous power of the
prosecutor: that he will pick people that he thinks he should get, rather
than pick cases that need to be prosecuted. With the law books filled
with a great assortment of crimes, a prosecutor stands a fair chance of

172

Jackson, supra note 59, at 5.
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finding at least a technical violation of some act on the part of almost anyone. . . . It is in this realm—in which the prosecutor picks some person
whom he dislikes or desires to embarrass, or selects some group of unpopular persons and then looks for an offense, that the greatest danger
of abuse of prosecuting power lies. It is here that law enforcement becomes personal, and the real crime becomes that of being unpopular
with the predominant or governing group, being attached to the wrong
political views, or being personally obnoxious to or in the way of the
173
prosecutor himself.

Justice Jackson was not alone in recognizing that the immense prosecutorial discretion exercised by the Executive Branch carries with it
this potential for abuse. Other commentators have raised similar
concerns about the arbitrary exercise of executive enforcement dis174
cretion.
Given these concerns, there may be, as Justice Jackson
suggested, only one reason to allow anyone to exercise such broad discretionary enforcement authority: “[I]t seems necessary that such a
175
power to prosecute be lodged somewhere.”
So the Take Care
Clause lodges that power in a governmental entity that is subject to
constitutional requirements, congressional oversight, and judicial review. Those legal and political checks, we hope, will prevent most
abuses of executive enforcement discretion.
The concerns about executive enforcement discretion suggest
why, as a constitutional matter, such prosecutorial discretion may not
be delegated to private parties. If a private plaintiff had the discretion to sue any person, anywhere in the country, for any violation of
law, she too would have the “most dangerous power of the prosecutor”—the power to target the defendants of her choice. And, as Gil-

173

Id.

174

See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach,
79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1686–97 (2004) (arguing that courts should conduct more searching review of enforcement decisions to “prevent[] . . . arbitrary agency decisionmaking”);
Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L.
REV. 13, 20 (1998) (“The deficiency of prosecutorial discretion lies not in its existence,
but in the randomness and arbitrariness of its application.”); Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Powers of Supervising, Prosecuting, Advising, Declaring and Informally Adjudicating, 63
HARV. L. REV. 193, 218–25 (1949) (arguing that administrative agencies’ enforcement
discretion creates the potential for “[a]dministrative arbitrariness”); James Vorenberg,
Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1553 (1981) (noting “the potential for arbitrariness and discrimination that such discretion creates”); see also Thomas,
supra note 58, at 152 (asserting that agencies should adopt enforcement guidelines to
“eliminat[e] the randomness and arbitrariness of individual enforcement decisions by individual agency personnel”).

175

Jackson, supra note 59, at 3 (“These powers have been granted to our law-enforcement
agencies because it seems necessary that such a power to prosecute be lodged somewhere.”).
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lian Metzger has observed, “[p]rivate delegates’ exemption” from the
legal and political checks on the Executive Branch “means that they
can wield [such] government powers in ways that raise serious abuse
176
of power concerns.”
Private parties not only could bring suit
against any person for any legal violation, but also would have far
greater freedom than the Executive Branch to target ideological opponents, persons of a particular ethnicity, or individuals that they
found “personally obnoxious.” The Article II nondelegation doctrine
prohibits private entities from exercising this “most dangerous power” and thereby serves as a prophylactic barrier against the arbitrary
exercise of private prosecutorial discretion.
This Article II nondelegation principle appears to be a logical extension of other constitutional rules that seek to protect private lib177
erty against arbitrary encroachment.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine, for example, is specifically designed to prevent the “arbitrary
178
enforcement” of federal and state law.
Thus, in Kolender v. Law179
son, the Court invalidated a statute that permitted police officers to
detain any individual who failed to provide what was, in a particular
180
officer’s view, “credible and reliable” identification.
The Court
emphasized that, by giving each officer “virtually complete discretion”
181
to detain individuals, the provision “furnishe[d] a convenient tool
for harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting offi182
cials, against particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure.”
Likewise, the “basic purpose” of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures “is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by govern183
184
mental officials.” Thus, in Delaware v. Prouse, the Court held that
police officers may not randomly stop vehicles on the highway, but

176
177
178

179
180
181
182
183
184

Metzger, supra note 158, at 1145.
See supra notes 167–69.
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58 (1983) (stating that the “principal element” of
the void-for-vagueness doctrine is “‘the requirement that a legislature establish minimal
guidelines’” to prevent “arbitrary enforcement” by law enforcement officials (quoting
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974))); see Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610,
1628 (2007).
461 U.S. 352.
See id. at 353–54, 361–62.
Id. at 358.
Id. at 360 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
440 U.S. 648 (1979).
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must have at least a reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation. The
Court declared that the government’s asserted safety concerns did
not “justify subjecting every occupant of every vehicle on the road[]
to a seizure . . . at the unbridled discretion of law enforcement offi186
187
cials.” And, in Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., the Court invalidated the
Occupational Health and Safety Act, insofar as it authorized war188
rantless inspections of employment facilities. Such laws “devolve[]
almost unbridled discretion upon executive and administrative offi189
cers . . . as to when to search and whom to search” and impermissibly leave the liberty of private citizens “to the discretion of the officer
190
in the field.”
Similar concerns about arbitrary interference with private liberty
have led the Court to invalidate delegations to private parties. For
191
example, in Fuentes v. Shevin, the Court struck down two state laws
that allowed creditors to “unilaterally invoke state power to replevy
goods” from debtors, without giving the debtor a pre-deprivation
192
hearing.
The Court emphasized that the hearing would help protect a debtor’s property rights “from arbitrary encroachment . . . a
danger that is especially great when the State seizes goods simply
193
upon the application of and for the benefit of a private party.”
194
And, in Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, the Court
struck down a local ordinance that gave private parties the authority
195
to veto the construction of an old-age home. The Court found this
“delegation of power” “repugnant” because the ordinance established

185

186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195

Id. at 663 (“[W]e hold that except in those situations in which there is at least articulable
and reasonable suspicion” of a particular traffic violation, “stopping an automobile and
detaining the driver . . . [is] unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”).
Id. at 661.
436 U.S. 307 (1978).
Id. at 325 (“We hold that . . . the Act is unconstitutional insofar as it purports to authorize
inspections without warrant or its equivalent . . . .”).
Id. at 323.
See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 550 (1967); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532
(1967); see id. at 534, 540 (applying the warrant requirement to local health inspections).
407 U.S. 67 (1972).
Id. at 93, 96.
Id. at 80–81; id. at 93 (stating that the statutes impermissibly “abdicate[d] effective state
control over state power”).
278 U.S. 116 (1928).
Id. at 118, 122–23 (finding that “the attempted delegation of power cannot be sustained,
and the restriction thereby sought . . . is arbitrary and repugnant to the due process
clause”).
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no “standard or rule” to guide the parties’ discretion, and thus left
196
them “free to withhold consent for selfish reasons or arbitrarily.”
The Article II nondelegation doctrine rests on similar premises.
Under this theory, Congress may not confer on private parties the
unbridled discretion as to when and whom to sue. The Article II
nondelegation principle thus helps ensure that private liberty is not
“subject to the discretion of [every would-be plaintiff] in the [na197
tion].”
This Article II nondelegation theory also finds support in separa198
tion of powers doctrine. In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court invalidated
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, in part because it delegated too much discretionary enforcement authority outside the Executive Branch. The statute in Buckley authorized the Federal Election Commission to bring enforcement actions against “any acts or
199
practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of this Act.”
The statute, in other words, permitted the FEC to see that federal
election law was obeyed. As we have seen, the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld such conferrals of standing on the Executive Branch.
But the FEC was not, as originally constituted, under the control of
the Executive Branch. Four of the six voting members of the Commission were appointed by Congress; only two were selected by the
200
President.
The Court held that, absent additional executive over201
sight, the FEC could not exercise its “wide ranging” “discretionary
202
power to seek judicial relief.”
196
197
198
199
200
201
202

Id. at 122.
Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967).
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
Id. at 111 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(5) (1970)).
See id. at 113 (describing the appointment process for the Commission).
Id. at 111.
Id. at 113, 137–41. The Court found that the Commission members were principal “Officers of the United States,” who must be appointed by the President (with the advice and
consent of the Senate) under the Appointments Clause. See id. at 132; see also U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2, cl. 2. My reliance on Buckley may seem to echo themes commonly associated
with unitary executive theory. Indeed, as Harold Krent has suggested, much of unitary
executive theory can be understood in Article II nondelegation terms. See, e.g., Krent, supra note 159, at 90 (“Congress’ many decisions to create private attorneys general represent substantial delegations of administrative authority.”). But unitary executive theory
may not serve as the most useful analytical tool in this context. Unitarians assert that any
person who exercises a discretionary executive function must be subject to the control
and supervision of the President. See Steven G. Calebresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1165 (1992)
(“Unitary executive theorists . . . conclude that the President alone possesses all of the executive power and that he therefore can direct, control, and supervise inferior officers or
agencies who seek to exercise discretionary executive power.” (footnote omitted)). This
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But what are the boundaries of this Article II nondelegation doctrine? Surely no one (not even those most committed to unitary ex203
ecutive theory) would seriously argue that private parties can never
exercise any prosecutorial discretion. Such a rule would prohibit all
private enforcement of the law. Every private plaintiff, even one who
has suffered a concrete injury-in-fact, has some discretionary enforcement authority. The injured party has, at a minimum, the discretion to decide whether or not to bring suit. A private organization
may exercise even more prosecutorial discretion: it can choose to
bring suit against any person that has injured one of its members, as
long as the suit is germane to the organization’s purposes.
I do not claim that the Article II nondelegation doctrine prohibits
all such exercises of private prosecutorial discretion. Instead, it prohibits the delegation of the Executive Branch’s duty to see that federal law or an area of federal law is obeyed. That was the line drawn
by Buckley, which invalidated a delegation of “discretionary power” to
see that federal election law was obeyed. And that prohibition goes a
long way toward preventing arbitrary exercises of private prosecutorial discretion, while at the same time allowing for private enforcement of the law. As the commentary on executive enforcement discretion suggests, it is that degree of “discretionary power” that seems
most susceptible to abuse. It may be true, as Justice Jackson suggested, that “such a power to prosecute [must] be lodged some204
where.”
But the Article II nondelegation doctrine instructs that
such a power to prosecute, and the accompanying prosecutorial discretion, may not be lodged everywhere.
2. Standing Enforces the Article II Nondelegation Doctrine
Once we identify the Article II principle at stake, the enforcement
of that principle is fairly straightforward. Standing doctrine helps ensure that private parties do not exercise the “discretionary power”

203
204

theory could be interpreted to mean that Article II prohibits any delegation of discretionary enforcement power, and accordingly that any private enforcement action is invalid.
(Every private enforcement action, after all, involves some discretion. The plaintiff has,
at a minimum, the discretion to decide whether to bring suit.) That is clearly not the law,
and I doubt many Unitarians would advocate such a position. But unitary executive theory does not seem to offer any principled means of distinguishing between enforcement
actions that require presidential supervision and those that do not.
See supra note 202.
Jackson, supra note 59, at 3.
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that inevitably accompanies the authority to see that federal law or an
area of federal law is obeyed.
First, standing doctrine prohibits private plaintiffs from asserting
abstract grievances that would give them a virtually unlimited amount
of prosecutorial discretion. Such grievances include the “injury to
the interest in seeing that the law is obeyed” as well as other abstract
concerns, such as a “special interest” in a particular area of law or a
“conscientious objection” to particular conduct. As we have seen, if a
private plaintiff had standing to see that the law was obeyed, she
could bring suit against any person, anywhere in the country, for any
violation. In a similar vein, if she sought to enforce a particular area
of law that aroused her “special interests” or “conscientious objections,” she could sue any person, anywhere in the country, for any violation of that area of law. Standing doctrine prevents private parties
from exercising such discretionary power to seek judicial relief.
Moreover, Article III standing doctrine allows a court to identify
private enforcement actions that do not implicate the Executive
Branch’s nondelegable Article II responsibilities. A plaintiff who can
demonstrate an Article III injury-in-fact does not have wide-ranging
discretionary power to bring suit. She may sue only the person that
caused her injury, and may seek redress only for that harm. The
Court may therefore allow such actions to go forward, without Article
205
II nondelegation concerns.
205

This Article II nondelegation theory of standing may help explain the decisions recognizing standing in suits under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”). FOIA permits any
person to request any type of information from a federal agency (including records about
a specific private individual or entity), without demonstrating any distinct interest in or
particular need for the material. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006); Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989); Burka v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 142 F.3d
1286, 1290–91 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting that a FOIA request can be made by “‘any person’” and that the requesting person is “not required” to demonstrate “any particular
need for the information”); McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1237–38 (3d Cir.
1993) (“A person seeking information under the FOIA . . . need not have a personal stake
in the information sought.”). If the agency declines to provide the requested material
(perhaps because it concludes that the material is exempt from disclosure, see 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b) (setting forth the statutory exemptions)), the individual may file suit, alleging
an “informational injury.” See Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 449 (stating that refusing to permit
an individual to review requested records “constitutes a sufficiently distinct injury to provide standing to sue”); Burka, 142 F.3d at 1290–91 (finding standing to bring suit where a
FOIA request was denied).
Scholars have suggested that FOIA is hard to reconcile with the Court’s Article III
standing jurisprudence. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing
as a Judicially Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170, 1189 (1993) (arguing
that the Court’s reasoning in Lujan “could easily support a holding that FOIA’s ‘any person’ standard is unconstitutional”); Sunstein, supra note 7, at 633 (urging that certain
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This Article II nondelegation theory suggests normative foundations for Article III standing doctrine that have been largely overlooked by commentators. Many scholars and jurists have assumed
that standing doctrine serves principally to prevent private interfer206
ence with executive enforcement efforts.
But the Article II nondelegation rationale for standing is built on far different premises.
Under this theory, standing doctrine does not safeguard the Executive Branch, but instead helps to shield individual liberty from arbitrary exercises of private prosecutorial discretion.
3. The Scope of the Constitutional Protection
The Article II nondelegation doctrine not only offers a different
normative foundation for standing doctrine, but also suggests a new
scope for the constitutional protection. Standing doctrine applies (as
a constitutional mandate) only in cases that implicate the liberty interests of particular private individuals.
This constitutional theory thus clearly encompasses all suits
against private parties, when a plaintiff might target the defendant
for nefarious reasons, such as ideological or racial animosity. But
suits against the Executive Branch can also implicate the liberty interests of particular private parties. For example, in Federal Election
Commission v. Akins, the plaintiffs urged the government to enforce
certain reporting requirements against the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, because of the plaintiffs’ ideological opposition to
207
that private group. And, in Sierra Club v. Morton and Valley Forge, the
plaintiffs sought to prevent the Executive Branch from conferring a

206
207

standing decisions appear to be on a “collision course with a number of statutes, including FOIA”); Winter, supra note 23, at 1496 (noting similarly that FOIA appears to be in
tension with aspects of the Court’s standing jurisprudence). But FOIA does not constitute an impermissible delegation of prosecutorial discretion. The statute does not give
“any person” the right to sue any person for any statutory violation. Instead, the statute
allows “any person” to seek a concrete benefit—information—from a federal agency. If
the agency provides the benefit (by producing the requested material), the requester suffers no harm and cannot bring suit. An individual suffers an injury and can file suit—and
thereby become a prosecutor—only if the agency declines to produce all or part of the
requested information. But, at that point, her prosecutorial discretion is limited. She
may sue only the agency that declined to produce the requested material, and may seek
only the information that the agency declined to disclose. Accordingly, FOIA does not
delegate to “any person” the degree of prosecutorial discretion exercised by the Executive Branch. FOIA provides breadth of discretion with respect to the underlying right to
seek information, but not with respect to the right to sue per se.
See supra notes 6, 15–22, and accompanying text.
See 524 U.S. 11, 15–16, 21–25 (1998). For further discussion of Akins, see infra note 209.

830

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 11:4

benefit on a specific private entity (in Morton, the corporation seeking
208
development permits, and in Valley Forge, the religious institution).
The Article II nondelegation principle applies in all cases that implicate the liberty interests of particular private individuals and entities. The theory thus encompasses all suits against private parties and
all suits against the government in which a private person is the real
party-in-interest. Accordingly, under the Article II nondelegation
doctrine, a plaintiff must demonstrate a concrete injury when (1) she
demands (as in Akins) that the Executive Branch impose a burden on
209
a specific private third party; or (2) she attempts (as in Morton and
Valley Forge) to prevent the Executive Branch from conferring a bene210
fit on another private party.
But this Article II theory does not require a showing of injury-infact in other suits against the federal government. Many such actions
do not implicate the liberty interests of particular private individuals.
That is true, for example, when a plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of a federal statute or the validity of a federal regulation.
Courts may have strong prudential and institutional reasons for dismissing such suits on standing grounds. As we have seen, private parties—in contrast to the Executive Branch—need not enforce the law
208

See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, 454
U.S. 464, 469, 482 (1982) (holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing, as federal taxpayers, to challenge the conveyance of property to a religious organization); Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 729–30, 738–41 (1972) (concluding that the plaintiff lacked standing, based solely on its “special interest” in environmental protection, to prevent the Department of Interior from issuing permits for the corporation’s proposed development
plan).

209

The Akins Court found that the plaintiffs had standing because they alleged a concrete
“informational injury.” See 524 U.S. at 12, 21 (observing that, under its cases, “a plaintiff
suffers an ‘injury in fact’ when the plaintiff fails to obtain information which must be publicly disclosed pursuant to a statute”). The Court’s analysis resembled its approach in
Freedom of Information Act cases. See supra note 205.

210

Notably, public officials also have private liberty interests. The Article II nondelegation
principle thus provides a constitutional foundation for the denials of standing in Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 210–11, 216–27 (1974) (alleging that
the Incompatibility Clause prohibits members of Congress from serving in the Armed
Forces Reserve, and urging the Reserve to discharge all legislators and to seek back pay
from any legislator who served), and Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 636 (1937) (claiming
that Justice Hugo Black’s appointment violated the Incompatibility Clause, and urging
the Court to remove him). This Article II theory may also provide an alternative rationale
for the seemingly inconsistent holdings in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 85–88 (1968) (finding standing in a suit challenging, on establishment clause grounds, the statutory criteria
by which the government disbursed funds to elementary and secondary schools), and Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 469, 482–87 (denying standing in a suit challenging, on establishment clause grounds, the transfer of property to a religious institution). In contrast to
Valley Forge, Flast did not implicate the liberty interests of any specific private parties.
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211

in a uniform or consistent manner.
They have no obligation to
faithfully execute every provision of law, but may instead concentrate
only on those provisions that arouse their “special interests.” A private organization could thus bring multiple lawsuits against an agency, forcing it to focus on that group’s “special interests,” and distracting it from other statutory responsibilities. Courts may quite
reasonably conclude that Congress is better equipped to decide when
the benefits of private enforcement outweigh such costs. Moreover,
courts have traditionally been in the business of settling disputes
brought by plaintiffs with a direct and concrete interest in a case. Accordingly, courts could decide, as a prudential matter, to adjudicate
challenges to statutes and regulations only when they are brought by
injured parties.
Such broad-based suits against the government do not, however,
raise the liberty or the arbitrariness concerns at the heart of the Article II nondelegation principle. Accordingly, this theory does not
prohibit Congress from conferring standing on “any person” to bring
212
such suits against the Executive Branch. Indeed, under this constitutional approach, Congress may authorize any private suit against
the federal government, as long as the plaintiff does not ask the government to impose burdens on, or deny benefits to, specific private
parties.
But this conclusion raises some questions about the Court’s refusal to recognize the congressional conferral of standing in Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife. The plaintiffs in Lujan brought suit against the
Department of Interior, claiming that one of its regulations was in213
consistent with the Endangered Species Act.
Such a broad attack
on federal law does not seem to implicate the constitutional analysis
here.
The citizen-suit provision in Lujan was not, however, confined to
such challenges to federal government action. Instead, the provision

211
212

213

See supra notes 141–49 and accompanying text.
Thus, under this theory, Congress could have conferred standing in United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176–77, 179–80 (1974) (denying standing in a suit alleging that the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 violated the Constitution’s Statement and Account Clause), and Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 127 (1922) (denying standing in a
suit challenging the validity of the Nineteenth Amendment). And the Court probably
should have found standing in Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 815–16, 829–30 (1997) (holding that members of Congress lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
Line-Item Veto Act, even though the statute expressly authorized the suit). In each case,
however, the Court may have had other reasons to dismiss the suit as nonjusticiable.
504 U.S. at 557–59.
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authorized “any person” to bring suit against “any person”—public or
private—alleging any violation of the Endangered Species Act or its
214
implementing regulations. The provision thus delegated to private
parties the Executive Branch’s duty to see that an area of federal law
is obeyed. The Article II nondelegation doctrine prohibits such delegations—not because of the way a particular plaintiff exercises such
discretion in a particular case, but because granting such authority to
every private party in the country raises a serious potential for arbitrary exercises of private prosecutorial discretion. It is thus the very
breadth of the grant, and not its application, that is the nub of the
constitutional infirmity. Accordingly, this Article II theory would
support a decision striking down the citizen-suit provision on its face
215
as an unconstitutional delegation of prosecutorial discretion.
The Article II nondelegation doctrine leaves Congress with some
leeway to authorize private suits against the federal government.
Congress may permit “any person” to bring enforcement actions that

214

16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988) (stating that “any person may commence a civil suit on his
own behalf . . . to enjoin any person, including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency . . . who is alleged to be in violation of” any provision of
the Endangered Species Act or its implementing regulations). Other citizen-suit provisions are similar. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (2000) (providing that
“any person” may sue “any person (including . . . the United States . . . ) who is alleged to
have violated . . . an emission standard or limitation”); Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a) (2000) (stating that “any person” may sue “any person (including the United States . . .)” alleging a
violation of “any standard, regulation, condition, requirement, or order” issued pursuant
to the statute).

215

The Court in Lujan never stated whether it held the citizen-suit provision unconstitutional on its face or as applied. Several commentators have assumed that the Court invalidated the provision as applied. See Nichol, supra note 6, at 317 (“[T]he Court [in
Lujan] held that the Endangered Species Act’s broad citizen standing provision, as applied, violated the Constitution.”); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77
N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1751–52 (1999) (same); Sunstein, supra note 5, at 200 (same). It is unclear why they make this assumption. They may be suggesting that the Court sought to
sever the unconstitutional applications of the citizen-suit provision. But, on that theory,
to ensure that the provision complied with the constitutional analysis here, the Court effectively would have had to rewrite it—to exclude not only all suits against private parties
but also all suits demanding that the Executive Branch impose burdens on, or deny benefits to, specific private parties. There are reasons to doubt that Congress would have enacted such a narrow “citizen-suit” provision. See supra note 214 (noting that other citizensuit provisions are as broad as the provision in Lujan). Accordingly, severance may not
have been a viable option. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 884–85 & nn.49–50 (1997)
(noting that the severability doctrine does not allow the Court to rewrite a statute to let it
stand); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 686–87 (1987) (observing that severability analysis depends on congressional intent). For these reasons, regardless of what
the Court intended to do, I believe it had reason to invalidate the citizen-suit provision on
its face as an unconstitutional delegation of prosecutorial discretion.
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do not implicate the liberty interests of particular private parties,
such as suits challenging the constitutionality of federal statutes or
the validity of federal regulations. But Congress may not confer
standing via citizen-suit provisions that transfer to private parties the
216
Executive Branch’s duty to “see that federal law is obeyed.”
4. Standing as a Requirement of Articles II and III
Some may wonder whether resort to Article III is necessary. If
standing protects an Article II nondelegation principle, then why not
217
analyze the issue solely in terms of Article II? That is certainly plausible. I have myself largely characterized the constitutional issue that
way.
But, even if standing may be conceived in Article II nondelegation
terms, federal courts would not necessarily be wrong to characterize it
as a “bedrock” requirement of Article III. Article III does, after all,
“defin[e] the role assigned to the [federal] judiciary in a tripartite al-

216

See supra note 214 (listing several citizen-suit provisions). The Article II nondelegation
doctrine may also leave room for congressional conferrals of standing in suits that implicate private liberty (i.e., suits against private parties and suits demanding that the Executive Branch impose burdens on, or deny benefits to, specific private parties). In that context, to comply with the Article II nondelegation principle, Congress might be able to
enact statutes that curtail private prosecutorial discretion. Thus, perhaps Congress could
define new statutory injuries in a way that, like current standing doctrine, limits both the
pool of potential prosecutors and constrains each potential plaintiff’s prosecutorial discretion. See supra notes 124–28 and accompanying text (explaining how standing doctrine places such constraints on private prosecutorial discretion); supra note 205 (noting
that the Freedom of Information Act does not delegate substantial prosecutorial discretion). Such an approach resonates with Justice Kennedy’s view that Congress may confer
standing on private parties, but “must at the very least identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at
580 (Kennedy, J., concurring). But, for purposes of this Article, I bracket questions about
the precise boundaries of Congress’s authority to confer standing by creating new statutory injuries. I note that, because the concept of a cognizable injury has itself changed
over time as our society has evolved, see supra notes 120–23; infra note 237 and accompanying text, it may be difficult for courts to develop ex ante a workable standard for assessing the limits of Congress’s authority. Cf. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n., 531 U.S. 457,
474–75 (2001) (observing that, in the Article I nondelegation context, the Court has
“‘almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree
of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law’” (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting))).

217

See Hartnett, supra note 11, at 2256 (asserting that, given the differences between Executive Branch and private party standing, the question of “Who can constitutionally be empowered to represent . . . public interests in court?” must be “a question of the proper interpretation, not of Article III or Article I, but of Article II”); supra notes 15–22 and
accompanying text.
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218

location of power” to ensure that “federal courts will not intrude
219
Fedinto areas committed to the other branches of government.”
eral courts would intrude into an area committed to the Executive
Branch, if they adjudicated private actions brought to see that the law
was obeyed. Accordingly, the issue may not be whether standing doctrine derives from Article II or Article III. It could be said to derive
220
from both provisions, interpreted in context.
The addition of Article II does, however, have significant implica221
tions in one context: state court actions. While Article III require222
ments apply only in federal court, the Article II nondelegation doctrine would apply in both federal and state court. Accordingly, this
theory would require state courts to identify some way of curtailing
private prosecutorial discretion, perhaps by applying standing doctrine. Although full consideration of this issue is beyond the scope of
this Article, I wanted to note this implication of adding Article II to
223
the equation.
5. Is Article III Standing Doctrine the Only Answer?
Some may doubt that Article III standing doctrine is the only way
to enforce the Article II nondelegation principle. That may be true,
but I am not aware of any approach that would work as effectively.
Some commentary suggests that Congress could cure any delegation problems by giving the Executive Branch the tools to supervise
private enforcement actions brought to “see that federal law is ob218
219
220

221
222
223

Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 11 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 755 (1976) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Cf. Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in
Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1278 (1995) (urging that invoking a
single provision “without regard to the structural relationships among various constitutional provisions is an inadequate mode of constitutional interpretation”).
Many thanks to Henry Monaghan for pointing out this implication of the Article II theory
articulated here.
See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (observing that “the constraints of
Article III do not apply to state courts . . . even when they address issues of federal law”).
The addition of Article II to the analysis could solve a separate problem. The Supreme
Court generally refuses to hear appeals from state court decisions when the underlying
state court plaintiff lacked Article III standing. If state courts applied standing doctrine
to enforce the Article II nondelegation principle, the Court could review more state court
interpretations of federal law. See William A. Fletcher, The “Case or Controversy” Requirement
in State Court Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 263, 265 (1990) (urging that,
to ensure Supreme Court review of state court decisions, “[s]tate courts should be required to adhere to article III ‘case or controversy’ requirements whenever they adjudicate questions of federal law”).
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eyed.” The argument seems to rely on Morrison v. Olson. In Morrison, the Court upheld a statute authorizing the creation of an Independent Counsel to “investigate and, if appropriate, prosecute certain high-ranking Government officials for violations of federal
226
criminal laws.” The statute gave the Independent Counsel considerable discretion to “initiat[e] and conduct[] prosecutions” in federal
227
court. But the Court upheld this delegation of prosecutorial discretion because the statute (in the Court’s view) gave the Executive
Branch sufficient statutory mechanisms to “supervis[e] or con228
229
230
231
trol[]” the initiation, scope, and duration of an Independent
Counsel’s activities.
There are, however, reasons to doubt that such a statutory scheme
would effectively curtail private prosecutorial discretion. We should
keep in mind that, in Morrison, the Court upheld a statute that would
allow a single public prosecutor (whose employment would com-

224

225
226
227
228
229

230

231

See, e.g., Myriam E. Gilles, Representational Standing: U.S. ex rel. Stevens and the Future of
Public Law Litigation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 315, 355, 361–67 (2001) (asserting that Congress
could, consistent with Article II, designate private citizens as the “agents” of the federal
government and allow them to bring suit to enforce federal law, as long as Congress gave
the Executive Branch the tools to oversee the private agents); Stephen M. Johnson, Private Plaintiffs, Public Rights: Article II and Environmental Citizen Suits, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 383,
397–402 (2001) (arguing that federal environmental laws authorizing citizen suits do not
violate Article II, because they give the Executive Branch various means of overseeing
such suits); see also Krent, supra note 159, at 95 (“Congressional delegations of executivetype authority outside the federal government might be accommodated with article II if
the Executive retains at least some practical control over the delegated authority.”).
487 U.S. 654 (1988).
Id. at 660.
Id. at 662 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 594(a)(9) (1982)).
Id. at 696.
The statute required the Attorney General to request that a special court appoint an Independent Counsel if he concluded that “there [were] ‘reasonable grounds’” for such an
independent inquiry. Id. at 661 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(1)(A)). The Court reasoned that the Attorney General could therefore also decline to recommend the appointment of an Independent Counsel. See id. at 696 (“[T]he Attorney General’s decision not to request appointment if he finds ‘no reasonable grounds to believe that
further investigation is warranted’ is committed to his unreviewable discretion.”).
The Court noted that, in requesting the appointment of an independent counsel, the
Attorney General was required to provide the special court with “sufficient information
to . . . defin[e] [the] independent counsel’s prosecutorial jurisdiction.” Id. at 661 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 592(d)). This obligation, the Court concluded, gave the Attorney General some authority over the scope of the Independent Counsel’s jurisdiction. See id. at
696 (“The Act thus gives the Executive a degree of control over the power to initiate an
investigation by the independent counsel.”).
The Court emphasized that the Attorney General could remove an independent counsel
for “good cause.” Id. at 686.
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mence only at the request of the Executive Branch) to exercise prosecutorial discretion. It seems at least plausible that the Executive
Branch could have both the means and the incentive to keep track of
the actions of this high-profile official charged with “prosecut[ing]
certain high-ranking Government officials for violations of federal
233
criminal laws.”
But the same cannot be said of private enforcement actions. That
is in part because, in attempting to carry out this oversight function,
the Executive Branch would be subject to the same budgetary and
time constraints that prevent it from pursuing every violation of federal law. The Executive Branch simply lacks the resources to supervise every private lawsuit brought to see that an area of federal law is
obeyed.
Furthermore, even if it were feasible, the Executive Branch might
still be disinclined to use such statutory tools to control private prosecutorial discretion. As Daryl Levinson has argued, the pervasive assumption that each branch of government aims at all times to main234
tain and increase its stranglehold on power is largely overstated. In
government today, there are many instances of governmental abdica235
tion. Although Professor Levinson does not apply this theory to enforcement actions, his thesis fits quite aptly in this context. The Executive Branch may often be tempted to allow private enforcement
actions to go forward absent executive supervision (and thereby avoid
236
any political fallout from those enforcement efforts).
Standing doctrine does not depend on the Executive Branch’s willingness or capacity to oversee private suits. It therefore appears to
be a more reliable means of enforcing the Article II nondelegation
principle than a statute akin to that in Morrison.
Standing doctrine may also be preferable to alternative mechanisms for enforcing the Article II nondelegation doctrine, because it
232
233
234

235
236

See supra note 229.
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 660.
See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV.
915, 917, 920 (2005) (observing that an “enduring and pervasive assumption in constitutional law and theory is that much government behavior is driven by self-aggrandizing
motives toward empire-building,” but asserting that it is today doubtful that “government
pervasively seeks to build empire of either the imperialistic or avaricious variety”).
See id. at 953–55 (discussing instances in which Congress leaves domestic and foreign policy decisionmaking up to the Executive Branch).
See Simons, supra note 74, at 931 n.169 (“[J]ust as Congress delegates broad enforcement
authority to prosecutors as a strategy to avoid political responsibility for the hard choices
prosecutors must make about whom to prosecute, prosecutors have a similar incentive to
resist that authority and the political responsibility it brings.”).
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is not a static legal formula. As our society and laws have changed,
the Supreme Court has expanded the injury-in-fact concept to cover
new injuries, including vote dilution and the inability to view a spe237
cies of wildlife.
Under the Article II theory articulated here, the
Court can continue to recognize novel injuries-in-fact, as long as it
defines those injuries in a way that curtails private prosecutorial dis238
cretion.
In presenting this defense of standing doctrine, I do not mean to
suggest that the outcomes of the Supreme Court’s standing decisions
are entirely defensible. It is often difficult to comprehend why the
Court recognizes certain injuries and not others, or adopts a narrow
view of causation and redressability in some cases and not others. I
assert here only that standing doctrine serves a useful purpose in ensuring that private parties do not exercise a law enforcement function
that the Constitution has assigned exclusively to the Executive
Branch.
V. CONCLUSION
Private enforcement actions clearly perform a valuable law enforcement function. The Supreme Court can facilitate this private
enforcement role by recognizing new injuries-in-fact, and thereby expanding the realm of potential private prosecutors. But there appears to be a policy and a constitutional rationale for preventing private parties from asserting abstract grievances, such as the “injury to
239
the interest in seeing that the law is obeyed.”
If a private plaintiff
had such prosecutorial authority, she could exercise the accompanying prosecutorial discretion to pursue the violators of her choice,
“unencumbered by the legal and practical checks” that constrain
240
“public enforcement agencies.”
That may be why the Constitution imposes the duty to “take care
241
that the laws [are] faithfully executed” upon the Executive Branch.
As Justice Jackson observed, “it seems necessary that [the] power to

237
238

239
240
241

See supra notes 120–23 and accompanying text.
Under this formulation, the injury-in-fact requirement need not be confined to those injuries that were recognized at common law. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Standing Injuries, 1993
SUP. CT. REV. 37, 55–57 (1993) (suggesting that such a limitation would harm regulatory
beneficiaries who often do not suffer traditional common law injuries).
FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998).
Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 680 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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prosecute” violations of federal law, and the accompanying prosecu242
torial discretion, “be lodged somewhere.” Such authority should be
“lodged” solely in a governmental entity that is expected—and consti243
tutionally required—to be “the guardian of [the] public interest.”

242
243

Jackson, supra note 59, at 3.
United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 27 (1960).

